Science, Technology & Innovation Studies Vol. 2 (2006), No 1 (March) by unknown
 STI 
Studies 
 
 
Science, Technology & Innovation Studies 
Vol. 2 (2006), No 1 (March) 
 
Content 
 
Ingo Schulz-
Schaeffer 
Raymund Werle 
Johannes Weyer 
 
Editorial 
Decision Making in Modern Societies 
2 
Petra Ahrweiler 
Nigel Gilbert 
Andreas Pyka 
Institutions Matter but … 
Organisational Alignment in Knowledge-Based 
Industries 
 
3 
Raymund Werle 
Eric J. Iversen 
Promoting Legitimacy in Technical Standardiza-
tion 
 
19 
Bernhard Wieser Inescapable Decisions. 
Implications of New Developments in Prenatal 
Testing 
 
41 
Kerstin von 
Locquenghien 
On the Potential Social Impact of RFID-
Containing Everyday Objects 
 
57 
 
ISSN: 1861-3675 
 
www.sti-studies.de
  
 
 
 
Science, Technology & Innovation Studies Vol. 2, March 2006 
STI 
Studies 
www.sti-studies.de 
 
 
Editorial 
Decision Making in Modern Societies 
 
Driven by the emergence of new technologies, modern societies are confronted 
with the necessity of making decisions which often turn out to be extremely diffi-
cult. Although modern technology is created in order to make life easier – and of-
ten does so – decisions at the individual, the organisational or the institu-
tional/societal level are morally more complicated than before. Given this complex-
ity, traditional decision-making patterns are no longer appropriate and new proce-
dures and institutional settings are required. 
Certain factors, which have driven this development, can be identified: First, the 
internationalisation and globalisation of technology, which requires efficient and 
legitimate global standards of interaction and communication (see the contribution 
of Raymund Werle and Eric J. Iversen). Second, the emergence of new forms of 
cross-border coordination, e.g. in international networks, which go beyond tradi-
tional governmental practices and sometimes counteract national policies (see 
Petra Ahrweiler, Nigel Gilbert and Andreas Pyka). Third, the compelling force of 
new technological opportunities and practices such as prenatal diagnostics which 
invalidates common patterns of decision making in the boundary area of life and 
death (see Bernhard Wieser). Last but not least the increasing autonomy of smart 
technology which gives rise to technological systems that replace human decision 
making by automated procedures of tiny, invisible, sensor-equipped computers (or 
networks of computers, see Kerstin von Locquenghien). 
In all these cases, human decision making is assisted or even replaced by new 
technological devices and procedures or by new socio-technical settings in the first 
place. But rather than eliminating the need for decisions these developments in-
crease the complexity of decision making. As a consequence, the implications con-
cerning opportunities and risks are not adequately considered or remain unknown. 
Modern societies need time to cope with the opportunities and the risks of new 
technology. Social practices and societal institutions change more slowly than 
technology. And often, the social adoption of new technologies results in unantici-
pated socio-technical settings. This issue of STI-Studies contributes to the reflec-
tion about socio-technical transformations which currently take place in different 
sectors of society. 
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Nigel Gilbert (University of Surrey) 
Andreas Pyka (University of Augsburg) 
received 21 October 2005, received in revised form 6 February 2006, accepted 13 February 
2006 
 
Abstract 
A comparison of the current structures and dynamics of UK and German biotech-
nology-based industries reveals a striking convergence of industrial organisations 
and innovation directions in both countries. This counteracts propositions from 
theoretical frameworks such as the varieties-of-capitalism hypothesis and the na-
tional innovation systems approach which suggest substantial differences between 
the industrial structures of the countries due to differing institutional frameworks. 
In this paper, we question these approaches and show that the observed structural 
alignment can be explained by the network organisation of research and produc-
tion in knowledge-based industries. 
                                                       
1 This work was partially supported by the German DAAD and the British Council within a 
three-year research project, Innovation networks in biotechnology-based industries. We 
thank our referees for their valuable comments. 
2 Corresponding author: ahrweiler@sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de 
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1 Introduction 
In knowledge-based economies the 
mechanisms of knowledge creation 
and utilisation are changing. Industrial 
economics and new innovation theory 
consider the increasing complexity of 
knowledge, the accelerating pace of 
the creation of knowledge, and the 
shortening of industry life cycles to be 
responsible for the rising importance 
of innovation networks. Knowledge-
intensive industries such as IT and 
biotechnology have already undergone 
structural changes towards these 
collective modes of knowledge produc-
tion and application. Such networks 
seem to be an important component of 
the emerging knowledge-based econo-
mies in which knowledge is crucial for 
economic growth and competitiveness. 
For some authors, the omni-present 
networks even "constitute the new 
social morphology of our societies” 
(Castells 2000: 500) which are accord-
ingly labelled as network societies. 
However, this suggests that network 
formation follows some global and 
universal trend affecting, unifying, and 
arranging all parts of society in "vari-
able geometries” (Castells 2000) where 
heterogeneity and diversity is sacri-
ficed for a single over-powering pat-
tern of development. As we have 
mentioned elsewhere (Pyka/Ahrweiler 
2004), this view does not take into 
account the complex reality of eco-
nomic phenomena deeply intertwined 
with cognitive, institutional, organisa-
tional and political aspects, i.e. a world 
of institutional variety, historicity and 
path-dependence. 
In this article, we argue that the rela-
tion between knowledge, networks 
and heterogeneous institutional 
frameworks is much more complicated 
than acknowledged by the protago-
nists of "globalisation” or the so-called 
network society. Network formation is, 
on the one hand, closely linked to the 
knowledge-intensity of a few indus-
tries and, on the other, not substitut-
ing but complementing the influence 
of institutional frameworks in order to 
co-ordinate economic action. The next 
paragraphs will work out these propo-
sitions in more detail. 
 
2 Institutions matter 
"At the start of the twenty-first century 
the role of institutions and the condi-
tions for institutional change are at the 
core of the economic debate in 
Europe” (Amable 2003: 1). Neo-
institutional approaches (e.g. North 
1981; Olson 1984) claim that institu-
tions shape the structure and dynam-
ics of societies: they emphasise that 
each national society has developed a 
context and path dependent institu-
tional infrastructure (politics, law, 
economy, culture). Economic actions 
are strongly influenced by these spe-
cific infrastructures, which accordingly 
lead to different national industrial 
structures and performances. 
2.1 Varieties of Capitalism 
Although, as the sociological "varieties 
of capitalism” (VoC) thesis states, 
national industries do look different, 
each formation can offer a particular 
comparative institutional advantage 
enabling economic success within the 
different national frameworks 
(Hall/Soskice 2001). VoC studies (e.g. 
Petit/Amable 2001; Amable 2003) 
maintain that UK and Germany have 
completely different institutional 
infrastructures: while the UK is la-
belled as a "liberal market economy”, 
Germany is deemed to be a "co-
ordinated market economy”. The 
differences are traced back to national 
regulations of labour and corporate 
law, to institutional differences in 
competence development and tech-
nology transfer, and to differences in 
financial systems. Considering these 
wide-ranging differences in the institu-
tional frameworks in UK and Germany, 
summarised in Table 1, it seems rea-
sonable to expect substantial differ-
ences in the organisation of their 
national industries. Generally, Ger-
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many is considered to be burdened 
with an "old” institutional infrastruc-
ture compared to the UK. German 
industrial society contains nationally 
unified institutions such as large 
industrial corporations, bureaucratic 
organisations, professional manage-
ment, dual professional education 
systems, social security systems, 
labour unions and formal regulation, 
hierarchical co-ordination and a 
taylorised structure of work. As Hei-
denreich states: "There are no signs 
that Germany and other Continental 
European economies will follow the 
British lead and will get rid of their 
institutional structures developed over 
decades. These particular institutional 
settings cannot be dismissed as the old 
garbage of industrial society” (Heiden-
reich/Toepsch 1998: 14; own transla-
tion). 
Compared to the UK, some require-
ments of modern knowledge societies 
(see e.g. OECD 1996) are less likely to 
be fulfilled by the institutional infra-
structure in Germany. Focussing on 
knowledge creation, knowledge trans-
fer and the commercialisation of 
knowledge, knowledge-based econo-
mies require permanent access across 
borders between nations and firms as 
a pre-condition for economic action. 
This is needed to achieve, for example, 
quick commercialisation of scientific 
results from basic research, easy 
access to finance for risk-intensive 
projects, the motivation of scientific 
entrepreneurs, and the availability of 
participative management skills. To 
satisfy project requirements, highly-
qualified and flexible staff have to be 
able to migrate without the hindrances 
resulting from firm and education 
barriers (for German difficulties in this 
area see Soskice 1997, EPOHITE 2000). 
Table 1 summarises the issues. 
The VoC literature would seem to 
predict that innovative industries, 
characterised by a high research 
intensity, extensive capital needs, and 
high risk and uncertainty, would face 
difficult development conditions in 
Germany and would be far less devel-
oped than the UK's – and that this will 
stay as it is because institutions 
change slowly, if at all. Compared to 
the UK, the comparative advantage of 
Germany would be best maintained by 
concentrating its strength in the con-
ventional industrial sectors. 
Table 1- National institutional frameworks in Germany and the UK 
 Germany UK 
Labour Law 
regulative (coordinated sys-
tem of wage bargaining; 
constraints on employee 
dismissals) 
liberal (decentralised wage 
bargaining; fewer barriers to 
employee turnover) 
Company law 
stakeholder system (two tier 
board system plus codetermi-
nation rights for employees) 
shareholder system (minimal 
legal constraints on company 
organisation) 
Skill formation 
and technol-
ogy transfer 
organised apprenticeship 
system with substantial in-
volvement from industry. 
Close links between industry 
and technical universities in 
designing curriculum and 
research 
no formal apprenticeship 
system for vocational skills. 
Links between universities 
and firms almost exclusively 
limited to R&D activities and 
R&D personnel 
Financial 
system 
primarily bank-based with 
close links to stakeholder 
system of corporate govern-
ance; no hostile market for 
corporate control 
primarily capital market 
system, closely linked to 
market for corporate control 
and financial ownership and 
control of firms 
Source: Casper/Kettler 2001: 14 
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2.2 National Innovation Systems 
The notion of "national innovation 
systems” (NIS) was introduced to 
innovation research in the 1980s to 
emphasise the important role played 
by the specific national institutional 
settings and non-economic actors for 
the innovative performance of an 
economic system. According to Beije 
(1998), an innovation system "can be 
defined as a group of private firms, 
public research institutes, and several 
of the facilitators of innovation, who in 
interaction promote the creation of 
one or a number of technological 
innovations [within a framework of] 
institutions which promote or facilitate 
the diffusion or application of these 
technological innovations" (Beije 1998: 
256). 
The NIS approach (Lundvall 1992; 
Nelson 1993) focuses on actors and 
their interactions embedded in a 
national institutional infrastructure. 
Innovation and innovation-based 
economic performance is organised 
differently across national borders. 
Like the VoC literature, the NIS ap-
proach concentrates on "the systemic 
aspects of innovation [and of] diffusion 
and the relationship to social, institu-
tional and political factors” (Fagerberg 
2003: 141). Lundvall, additionally, 
contributes an emphasis on compe-
tence building and the learning capa-
bilities of individuals, organisations, 
regions and nations (Lund-
vall/Tomlinson 2002: 218, see the 
Aalborg-Freeman approach of NIS 
(Lundvall 1992)). Differentiating, 
elaborating and complementing the 
NIS concept, recent research targets 
sectoral systems of innovation 
(Malerba 2002), technological systems, 
regional innovation systems and local 
technology clusters (Feldman et al. 
2005). 
The NIS approach suggests a diagnosis 
similar to that of the VoC studies3. 
                                                       
3 For a detailed comparison of recent NIS 
and VoC approaches see Werle 2005. 
Balzat summarises the results of the 
2003 innovation report of the German 
Ministry of Economics: "On the nega-
tive side, Germany has problems to 
catch up with the USA and with the 
Nordic European countries in the 
development and dissemination of 
technologies such as ICT and biotech-
nology. A rapid reversal of the German 
"backwardness” in this high technol-
ogy field seems rather unlikely for 
three main reasons. First, Germany 
has lost ground in the level of ICT 
expenditure within the last decade. 
Second, the German labor market falls 
short of highly qualified workers and 
technical engineers. Third, the industry 
in the Eastern part of Germany is still 
far behind the West German in produc-
tivity levels and in the innovativeness 
of business firms” (Balzat 2004: 115). 
In order to compare different national 
institutional frameworks of innovation, 
Balzat constructed a NIS model con-
taining 54 indicators that operational-
ise 19 sub-blocks of six main NIS 
components (knowledge base, financ-
ing conditions, internationalisation, 
innovation and learning incentives, 
innovative efforts, framework condi-
tions)4. Figure 1 shows a simplified 
version of his NIS performance model. 
Using this set of indicators with the 
operationalisation mentioned in Balzat 
(2004), the differences between the 
national innovation systems of UK and 
Germany can be visualised as in Figure 
2. The different designs of the national 
innovation systems in UK and Ger-
many can easily be seen. Whereas the 
German system performs better in the 
dimensions of innovative efforts, 
knowledge base and internationalisa-
tion, the UK system shows advantages 
with respect to financing conditions,.
                                                       
4 For a discussion of parameter construc-
tion, indicator building and interpretation 
of results, see Balzat 2004: 156-218. 
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learning incentives and framework 
conditions, all features important for 
the evolution of entrepreneurial indus-
tries. Summarising, both the VOC and 
the NIS approaches leave us with the 
same set of research hypotheses about 
Germany's and the UK's knowledge-
based innovation. For the UK, as the 
example par excellence of a liberal 
market economy (Amable 2003), we 
expect entrepreneurial knowledge-
intensive industries supported by 
progressive venture capital focussing 
on blockbusters following radical 
product innovation strategies. For 
Germany, as the example par excel-
lence for a co-ordinated market econ-
omy (Amable 2003), we expect, mutatis 
mutandis, industries with a small rate 
of entry, conservative venture capital if 
any, and focussing on incremental 
innovation, i.e. process innovation. 
Figure 1: Indicators for comparing different institutional frameworks 
(Source: Balzat 2004: 158) 
Employment-related factors 
Private R&D spending 
Public R&D spending 
Gross domestic R&D spending 
Macroeconomic framework 
R&D incentives 
Diffusion of ICT 
Tax burden 
Present inventiveness 
(scientific success) 
Future inventiveness 
(real measures) 
Future inventiveness 
(monetary measures) 
VC availability 
Financial market costs 
Financial market institutions 
Capital market openness 
Science and education 
FDI inflows 
High-tech trade 
Innovation and learning
incentives 
Innovative efforts 
 
Framework conditions 
 
Knowledge base 
 
Financing conditions 
 
Internationalization 
 
NIS 
 
Present inventiveness 
(personal) 
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3 Institutions matter but… 
There seems to be general agreement 
about the varying institutional frame-
works of UK and Germany. For the 
manufacturing industries, in the last 
twenty years this has lead to divergent 
developments in Germany and Britain 
(e.g. machine tools and car manufac-
turing, for an overview comparing 
industrial structures in both countries 
cf. Matraves 1997). As the varieties of 
capitalism hypothesis states, this is 
also – and even especially – expected 
for the knowledge-intensive industries. 
In the following sections we shall 
consider the so-called "red” biotech-
nology sector, which covers pharma-
ceutical applications of molecular 
biology, also often referred to as 
"biopharmaceuticals”. Contrary to the 
expectations we derived from the VoC 
and NIS approaches, we shall observe 
striking structural and procedural 
similarities. The biopharmaceutical 
industries of the two countries have 
become more and more similar both in 
their focus on product and process 
technologies, and in the make-up of 
their industrial organisations (clusters, 
start-ups, spin-offs etc.). 
 
3.1 Empirical evidence: the biophar-
maceutical sector 
In this section we will present some 
statistics describing the bio-
pharmaceutical industries in the 
United Kingdom (UK) and in Germany 
(D).5 
Figure 3 demonstrates market sizes 
and their growth, measured by the 
percentage of GDP of pharmaceutical 
sales. The markets are of similar size 
in both economies and the trends 
show the same direction. 
Figure 4 compares the markets for 
pharmaceuticals in UK and D by de-
picting the market shares of novelties 
introduced by national companies 
within the last 5 years. Again the 
development and the overall sizes are 
rather similar for Germany and the 
United Kingdom. However, the German 
figure is slightly above the British 
figure over the whole time period. 
                                                       
5 Except that, in some cases, the data we 
would like to have presented is not avail-
able and so we have used data about the 
pharmaceutical sector as a whole. A con-
siderable part of the new technologies in 
the pharmaceutical sector are based on 
methods from biotechnology. 
Figure 2 - Comparing NIS components of UK and Germany 
Innovative efforts
Knowledge base
Financing conditions
Innovation and learning incentives
Framework conditions
Internationalization
Germany
United Kingdom (Source: Balzat 2004) 
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Figure 5 - International comparison of the number of core biotech firms 
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Source. Ernst & Young, 2004
 
 
Figure 4 - Share of innovations in the pharmaceutical market in UK 
and D 
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Figure 3 - Market Size in UK and D 
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Figure 5 describes the size of the 
biotech firm population. For 2003, 
Ernst & Young (2004) records a rather 
similar number of firms in the two 
nations. If we look at the development 
of the firm population over time (Fig-
ure 6) we see that the number of 
German biotech firms has increased 
continuously and since 1999 is even 
slightly greater than the number in the 
UK in the same years. 
If we examine the number of venture 
capital (VC) cooperations in both 
countries shown in figure 7, a corre-
sponding similarity can be observed. 
The number of deals in Germany is 
slightly above those in the United 
Kingdom, whereas the amount of 
money involved in transactions is 
higher in the United Kingdom than 
Germany. 
These findings seem contrary to what 
would be expected from the VoC 
literature concerning a comparison 
between the German and the UK 
biotech industries. A considerable 
entry of firms was only expected for 
the UK; for Germany, a similar devel-
opment was not expected at all. Of 
course, a major reason for the prolif-
eration of biotech firms in Germany 
must be the huge efforts to support 
entrepreneurial behaviour coming 
from technology policy. 
 
Figure 7- VC cooperations in UK and D 
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Source: Ernst & Young, 2004  
Figure 6 - Development of private biotech firms in UK and D 
0
100
200
300
400
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Germany UK
Number of private biotechnology companies 
Source: Ernst & Young, 2004
 
Ahrweiler/Gilbert/Pyka: Institutions matter but ... 11 
 
 
3.2 Empirical evidence: firm strategies 
The VoC studies also suggested that 
German firms would pursue innova-
tion strategies that excluded product 
innovation, e.g. the development of 
therapeutics, expecting this country to 
stick with process innovation. Instead, 
data from 2004 show that more than 
half (56%) of the German biotech 
companies consider the development 
of therapeutics as their main area of 
action. A more detailed comparison 
from 2002 also points in this direction: 
In 2004, 32 firms in each country were 
developing therapeutics that had 
already reached the clinical phase. 
Managers from UK and Germany 
reported similar reasons for their 
strategic decisions (Ernst & Young 
2004). Chances, possibilities and risks 
are estimated in similar ways by man-
agers in the two countries. A compari-
son of the number of new drugs intro-
duced to the market in both countries 
(figure 8) shows that also the final 
outcome in UK and Germany is rela-
tively similar. 
Figure 9 shows German and British 
R&D efforts in an international com-
parison. The relative position of Ger-
many slightly worsens in the time 
period shown, but both nations have 
very similar shares of the global total. 
In Figure 10 we see the percentage of 
all pharmaceutical patents awarded to 
a country divided by the percentage of 
R&D efforts of its pharmaceutical 
industry, a measure of R&D efficiency. 
The efficiency for UK is higher over the 
four periods investigated. However, 
again the trend is in the same direction 
for both countries. 
Figure 11 shows the time elapsing 
between the first application in any 
market and the launch in the particular 
national market in Germany and UK. 
The three main reasons for delay are 
company strategy (when to apply, 
when to launch), the length of the 
regulatory process, and the length of 
the pricing and reimbursement proc-
ess. The time between approval and 
launch in the national market is 
somewhat shorter in Germany com-
pared to the United Kingdom. How-
ever, in Germany it takes considerably 
longer if the time span between the 
first application and the application to 
the national market is considered. The 
regulatory conditions in Germany are 
accordingly less favourable in this 
single respect. 
This section has clearly indicated the 
overall structural similarity of UK's and 
Germany's biopharmaceutical indus-
tries. The similarity is also visible from 
other countries: the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows show that 
Germany, a 'co-ordinated' market 
economy according to the VoC thesis, 
is deemed as attractive as the UK, a 
'liberal' market economy. Table 3 
signifies the general FDI inflows for 
certain years without distinguishing 
sectors (here, Germany even overtakes 
the UK). While there is no data specifi-
cally for the biopharmaceutical sector, 
FDI Media Information (2005) shows 
that there were 23 FDI projects in the 
UK and 18 in Germany for the pharma-
ceutical sector as a whole. 
 
Table 3: FDI inflows (as a % of GDP) 
 1995 1999 2002 
UK 1,8% 5,8% 1,6% 
D 0,5% 2,6% 1,9% 
Source: PICTF 2004 
Table 2: Products in pipeline in 2002: 
comparison of Germany and UK 
  Germany UK 
Products in 
pipeline 
200 194 
* pre-clinical 117 65 
* clinical phase I 34 50 
* clinical phase II 22 56 
* clinical phase III 3 23 
 
Source: Ernst & Young 2004 
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Figure 8 - Number of drugs introduced by UK and German firms 
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Figure 9 - Relative weight of research in the pharmaceutical industries 
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Figure 10 - R&D efficiency 
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Having now presented empirical sup-
port to show that the postulated 
differences between the German and 
British economies fail to be revealed 
when the recent development of bio-
pharmaceuticals is examined, the 
observed convergence needs explana-
tion. 
 
3.3 Explaining the data: organisa-
tional alignment via innovation 
networks 
Why do we observe these strong 
similarities in comparing the UK's and 
Germany's biopharmaceutical indus-
tries? The data summarised in the 
previous sections clearly offer no 
support for the research hypotheses 
arising from the VoC and NIS literature 
that predicted large differences in the 
two national settings. One possibility 
is that the national innovation sys-
tems, i.e. the institutional frameworks, 
of both countries, have themselves 
converged. However, this potential 
explanation is ruled out by recent 
studies focussing on their persistent 
differences (cf. Amable/Barré/Boyer 
1997; Balzat 2004). Another potential 
explanation could be that the bio-
pharmaceutical sector has some 
special characteristics which might 
overwhelm the effects of national 
institutional differences. 
Our hypothesis is that all knowledge-
intensive industries have characteris-
tics which differ greatly from other 
industrial sectors: these characteristics 
directly affect innovation performance 
and provoke network formation and 
internationalisation. In the long run, 
the network effects of collaborative 
innovation mitigate or even overcome 
the effects of differences in institu-
tional frameworks. 
What are the special characteristics of 
the biopharmaceutical sector that 
trigger interactional collaborative 
innovation? Taking drug development 
as the most prominent feature of 
radical innovation in the biopharma-
ceutical industries, the first character-
istic is the demand for up-to-date 
expertise which requires a permanent 
connection with the frontiers of re-
search. For example, Herrera (2001) 
states: "research is the engine of 
Europe's Biotech Industry". Biotech 
firms are permanently "operating at 
the cutting edge of a set of technolo-
gies" (ibid) closely connected to uni-
versities and public research organisa-
tions. Furthermore, the development 
of a single drug needs a combination 
of different knowledge stocks and 
specialised expertise in a number of 
fields; it requires, for example, exten-
sive clinical testing. Small firms such 
as university spin-offs have to build up 
a close connection to hospitals and big 
pharmaceutical firms in order to get 
access to relevant knowledge in these 
areas. 
Because biopharmaceutical innova-
tions rely on 'combinatorial technolo-
Figure 11: Time spans for market introduction 
of novelties 
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0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003
approval in market - launch in market
application in market - approval in market
1st w orld application - application in market
Germany
Source: PICTF, 2004
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003
approval in market - launch in market
application in market - approval in market
1st w orld application - application in market
United Kingdom
Source: PICTF, 2004
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gies', large firms also have a need for 
networking: "Vertical integration is no 
longer the only way for pharmaceutical 
companies to have access to comple-
mentary and specific assets, especially 
at the first stage of cooperation. They 
take advantage of the complementary 
and combinatorial nature of biotech-
nologies to conceive new organisa-
tional forms within a cooperative 
relationship with both start-ups and 
public or quasi-public research organi-
sations. Most pharmaceutical compa-
nies are engaged in more or less 
complex operations such as mergers 
and acquisitions, joint ventures, cross-
licensing and, more generally multi-
firm alliances. They often involve 
several bilateral strategic alliances 
with different actors. In this context, 
the strategy is to focus on many part-
nerships with widely diverse compe-
tencies and goals. At the industry level, 
this leads to a very complex mapping 
of ties between actors" (Staropoli 1998: 
13-23). 
How can these high demands for 
expertise, knowledge and R&D in 
various disciplinary fields be satisfied 
when they require the collaboration of 
actors from all over the world located 
in different types of organisations? By 
using the national public and private 
R&D efforts as input indicators and the 
number of national patents and other 
similar measures as output indicators, 
the VoC and NIS literatures conclude 
that national knowledge bases are 
restricted. External and in particular 
foreign knowledge sources are not 
adequately considered. Facing the 
global knowledge requirements men-
tioned above, these restrictions must 
be overcome on the firm level by 
actors who combine their compe-
tences and expertises – competences 
that cannot necessarily be found only 
at the national level. Innovation per-
formance in knowledge-intensive 
industries, either incremental or radi-
cal, can only be achieved via interna-
tional and inter-organisational part-
nerships. 
Accordingly, we observe high and 
increasing collaborative activity in 
knowledge-intensive industries. Illus-
trating the general trend, figure 12 
shows the new international strategic 
technology alliances for IT and bio-
technology. The amount of collabora-
tive activity at least matches and 
sometimes overtakes the cumulative 
number of collaborations for all other 
Figure 12: Increasing network activity in knowledge-intensive industries 
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technologies (National Science Board 
2002 Fig. 2-36). 
In knowledge-intensive industries 
network formation does not seem to 
be a passing phenomenon, which 
disappears with the maturation of the 
industry. Instead, networks persist as 
the main structuring principle of the 
biotech industry despite firms chang-
ing their components, attachment 
strategies and structural properties. 
For example, in the UK and German 
biopharmaceutical industries, collabo-
rative activity can be observed as a 
permanent feature. Collaboration is so 
important that a number of "match-
making” firms (e.g. Pharmalicensing 
Intl. Inc., BioScan) have been estab-
lished whose role is to inform compa-
nies about possible international 
partners. 
For example, 86 percent of German 
dedicated biotechnology firms have 
R&D partnerships either with other 
firms or with research organisations 
(EBIS 2000). Not surprisingly, for both 
Germany and the UK, we observe a 
strong increase of collaborative activity 
in the early phase of the development 
of their biotech industries because of 
missing absorptive capacities and the 
inflexibility of established big firms 
(large diversified firms, LDFs), which 
have to rely on specialised small high 
tech enterprises (dedicated biotech 
firms, DBFs) to act as translators in 
order to bridge knowledge gaps 
(Pyka/Saviotti 2005). For their part, 
DBFs need the LDFs as commercialis-
ers of their technological knowledge. 
As a result, we observe a change of the 
sectoral knowledge base: LDFs collect 
competences via fusions and acquisi-
tions; and DBFs and LDFs form net-
works in order to benefit from one 
another's competences. The observed 
early co-operations between LDFs and 
DBFs are not restricted to a national 
level, as can be seen in table 4. 
Later in the development of the sector, 
the composition, attachment strategies 
and structural properties of the net-
works change to a stronger focus on 
DBF-DBF partnerships and to the 
growth of financing as a tie between 
firms, in addition to R&D links (for a 
description of a similar evolution of 
network dynamics in the US biotech 
industries, see Powell et al. 2005). The 
Table 4: Examples of international LDF-DBF networks 
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Affymax 2     1 1  1 2      
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ArQule 2       1        
British Biotech. 1     2    1 1 2    
Celltech   1      2     2 
Chiron       1 1  1   1   
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Human Genome Scie.        1    3    
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Source: Pyka/Saviotti 2000: 28 
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trend towards international network 
formation also increases. Figure 13 
shows the co-patenting activity of 
German and UK biotech firms with 
foreign partners.  
UK firms have a higher proportion of 
co-patents but have less patents in 
total, which means that the two curves 
converge, providing yet more evidence 
of the similarities of the industries in 
the two countries, noted above. 
Another factor leading to network 
formation and internationalisation is 
the biopharmaceutical industry's need 
for capital. To develop a new drug, 
capital of about 600 Mill. EUR must 
typically be available and the develop-
ment will need a period of about 10-12 
years until the point when commer-
cialisation is a possibility. The im-
mense resources required for R&D, 
clinical testing and marketing exceed 
the capabilities of single firms. The 
risks and uncertainty inherent in new 
drug development are indicated by the 
high exit rate of projects and firms. 
When Germany is stated in the VoC 
and NIS literature to be at a disadvan-
tage in the area of radical innovations 
such as drug development or in suc-
cessfully establishing knowledge-
based industries as a whole, it is the 
capital requirements and risks that are 
mainly considered. Summarising, it is 
argued (Casper/Kettler, 2001: 16f.) that 
the national institutional framework in 
Germany makes money scarce for risk-
intensive and expensive projects (see 
above). However, this is true – at least 
in these dimensions – for any national 
economy, including the UK. To over-
come the problem, network formation 
is the strategy of choice in both Ger-
many and the UK. The missing re-
sources are gained within globally-
oriented innovation networks (interna-
tional VC-DBF partnerships; interna-
tional DBF-LDF partnerships, cross-
border mergers and acquisitions). In 
addition we have shown in section 3.2 
that foreign direct investment is im-
portant for the biotechnology-based 
industries as an external source for 
financing innovation. 
 
4 Conclusions 
National frameworks alone cannot 
provide the necessary knowledge 
stocks and financial resources to 
produce innovation in knowledge-
Figure 13: Biotechnology patents (UK and D) with foreign partners 
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intensive industries. Complementing 
the collaborative activity on the na-
tional and regional level which is 
already significant, we observe in-
creasing international network forma-
tion as the main organisational feature 
of research and production. These 
collaborations are intended to alleviate 
the disadvantages stemming from the 
restrictions of national institutional 
infrastructures. 
While heterogeneity persists at the 
level of institutional frameworks and 
path-dependent innovation environ-
ments, the differences are of decreas-
ing relevance in knowledge-intensive 
industries, where networks dominate 
industrial organisation and lead to 
convergence and alignment. In knowl-
edge-intensive sectors such as the 
biopharmaceutical industry, the neces-
sities of knowledge exchange, transfer, 
co-operation and diffusion between 
firms leads to a strong structural and 
dynamic alignment of national indus-
tries. Inter-organisational networks 
seem to offer a kind of "second order 
co-ordination” alongside institutional 
frameworks shaping economic action. 
Commonalities and differences of 
different "capitalisms” (as proposed by 
the VoC approach) or national institu-
tional frameworks (the NIS approach) 
must be re-considered for modern 
knowledge societies. 
Research is necessary to show how 
networks perform this alignment 
process and which network features 
qualify for what organisational re-
flexes. Social network analysis (e.g. 
Granovetter/Swedberg 2001; Kadushin 
2004) suggests that dense networks 
(e.g. those now being established in 
the knowledge-based industries) tend 
to show the alignment of members and 
processes as a typical effect due to 
knowledge distribution in networks. 
The network members become more 
similar not only in their knowledge but 
also in their intentions and strategic 
behaviour. Agent-based modelling of 
network formation in knowledge-
based industries (Gilbert et al 2001, 
Ahrweiler/Pyka/Gilbert 2004) sheds 
some light on the procedural aspects 
of these issues. Nevertheless, further 
theoretical, empirical and modelling 
efforts are required to work on the 
complex features of innovation dy-
namics and industrial organisation in 
knowledge-based economies. 
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Abstract 
In this article we examine the legitimacy of committee standardization as an alter-
native to pure market processes of technical standardization of information and 
communication technology (ICT). We argue that not only mandatory (regulative) 
but also voluntary (coordinative) standards require some kind of democratic le-
gitimacy. While the question of how to achieve this legitimacy has become central 
to today's changing world of standards, this situation is not adequately reflected in 
how the mounting legitimacy-deficit is treated. We note here that there remains a 
tendency to think of the legitimacy-deficit primarily in terms of "input legitimacy" 
criteria. At the same time we observe a tendency for standardization organizations 
(SDO) to orient efforts towards achieving "output legitimacy" by developing stan-
dards that are regarded by diverse groups of (legitimizing) stakeholders as consti-
tuting "good standards". This article therefore applies the distinction between input 
and output legitimacy to the rapidly evolving standardization landscape, arguing 
that it is necessary to expand the analysis of the legitimacy-deficit in the formal 
bodies responsible for ICT standards. We address what democratic legitimacy 
means in terms of standards and standardization, discuss why it is particularly 
important here, and explore how it has been addressed. Current examples indicate 
that in order to arrive at "good" standards SDO extend and redefine the cognitive 
and normative frame of standardization. This frame change helps to include non-
technical and non-commercial interests and values without directly involving the 
growing variety of stakeholders and civil society advocates in the process.  
                                                       
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 7th Conference of the European Socio-
logical Association (Torun, Poland, Sept. 9-12, 2005) in the session "Science, Technology 
and the Public" of the Research Network Sociology of Science and Technology (SSTNET) and 
at the Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research (SCORE) Conference "Organizing the 
World" (Stockholm, Sweden, Oct. 13-15, 2005). We would like to thank two anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful comments. 
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1 Introduction 
Legitimacy of standards and the stan-
dardization process has become abso-
lutely central to today's changing 
world of standards. Yet there remains 
a tendency to think of the legitimacy-
deficit in standards primarily in terms 
of "input legitimacy" criteria, especially 
in terms of representation of different 
stakeholders during the standardiza-
tion process. This focus on input 
legitimacy alone however inevitably 
falls short of the expectations of the 
theory of democratic representation 
which it attempts to live up to. Legiti-
macy based on this form of represen-
tation is extremely difficult if not 
impossible to accomplish in standardi-
zation. This has increasingly been 
recognized by the standardization 
organizations (SDO) which have 
started to work around the limitations 
of the engrained focus on input legiti-
macy alone. 
A starting point for the article is thus 
the observable trend for SDO to re-
orient their quest for increased legiti-
macy around efforts to achieve "output 
legitimacy" by developing standards 
that are regarded by diverse groups of 
(legitimizing) stakeholders as consti-
tuting "good standards". Here we 
observe that SDO increasingly attempt 
to provide for the consideration of 
interests and values of groups such as 
environmentalists, consumers or 
employees. Recently civil society 
groups have tried to establish more 
general public policy interests as the 
basis for deliberation in some SDO. 
This reinforces efforts of the SDO to 
avoid overloaded processes that at-
tempt to directly involve too many 
stakeholders and advocates but to 
draw attention to their interests and 
values through modifying the cognitive 
and normative frame in which stan-
dard setting takes place. 
In this light the article applies the 
distinction between input and output 
legitimacy to the evolving standardiza-
tion landscape on the premise that 
effectively addressing the legitimacy-
deficit requires coordinating both 
input and output based legitimacy 
approaches that are appropriate to 
different standards settings. We par-
ticularly address the area of voluntary 
ICT standards because these directly 
affect core aspects of the network 
society. We discuss whether different 
types of standards involve different 
legitimacy requirements, distinguish 
between input and output legitimacy, 
and look at the cognitive and norma-
tive frame of the committee delibera-
tions in order to more precisely ana-
lyze the strategies of the standardiza-
tion organizations to meet the legiti-
macy requirements. Some illustrations 
of more recent output-oriented meas-
ures are also presented. 
 
2 Standards and legitimacy 
2.1  Focus on ICT standards 
Standards are acknowledged to be 
building-blocks for the information 
society. What these blocks are, how 
and why they come about, and what 
they achieve are matters the literature 
has, somewhat curiously, found diffi-
cult to provide uniform answers. The 
heterogeneity of concepts and defini-
tions of standards and standardization 
testifies to the heterogeneity of the 
phenomenon. But it also reflects the 
fact that standards and the standardi-
zation landscape in which they are set 
continue to undergo profound change 
as a function of the brisk dynamics of 
the industry and changing power 
relations. 
To a large extent the dynamics of the 
ICT industry are responsible for this 
change in institutional, organizational 
and process aspects of standardiza-
tion. These are reflected in: 
• The formal setting in which the 
process takes place (on markets, 
among firms, by committees). 
• the rationale that initiated the 
process (e.g. to establish technical 
compatibility, to promote competi-
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tive advantage, to minimize nega-
tive externalities), 
• the mechanisms employed to 
involve the relevant stakeholders 
and allow them to help shape the 
standard (membership conditions,  
intellectual property rights, regula-
tory requirements, etc.), 
• as well as characteristics of the 
outcome (public-good, private good 
content) and the forces that shape 
the expectancy to adopt or other-
wise comply with the output. 
How a standard comes into being and 
according to which mode it diffuses 
are crucial dimensions which affect the 
democratic legitimacy of the standard. 
This applies to all kinds of standards – 
product and process standards, meas-
urement standards but also newer 
types of management standards. They 
all carry a cognitive or normative 
expectation to comply. Despite many 
commonalities there are also crucial 
differences between standards groups. 
The argument here focuses on the 
legitimacy of committee standardiza-
tion as an alternative to pure market 
standards processes. Our attention is 
concentrated on standards in ICT since 
this technological area brings together 
a pronounced reliance on standards 
on the one hand, with a central socie-
tal importance as the core of the 
network society on the other. Informa-
tion and communication technology 
accelerates the diffusion of inter-
organisational networks and intensi-
fies communication and collaboration 
between organizations and individuals 
(Castells 2001). ICT facilitates e-
business and e-government if stan-
dards are available and complied with. 
They ensure the compatibility of com-
ponents and the accuracy of technical 
operations and they guide the use of 
the systems. The standards impinge on 
the benefit and risk which the utiliza-
tion of technology entails for users and 
third parties as well. It has been ar-
gued that standards might even have 
an effect on the "democratic quality" of 
ICT (cf. Iversen et al. 2004). 
2.2 Important distinctions in the 
world of standards  
Concerning the legitimacy of standards 
it is important to distinguish between 
standards set on markets and those 
that involve formal standardization 
procedures. In the first case, individual 
commercial interests can manage to 
promulgate ICT solutions on the 
market where they become de-facto 
standards. The market is the ultimate 
selection environment for technologies 
and this is the default situation for the 
diffusion of standards incorporated in 
the technology. The diffusion of de-
facto standards is based on market 
leadership or on bandwagon and 
imitation processes, in which the 
number of actors attracted by a stan-
dard increases with the number of 
those who have already adopted the 
standard. 
Other standards are developed and 
agreed on in committees. Such com-
mittees, generally called standards 
developing organizations (SDO), are 
dedicated to the joint elaboration of 
standards. The SDO differ with respect 
to their degree of explicit institution-
alization – some have a more official 
others a more informal character – but 
they share many procedural elements 
and rules of collaborative committee 
standardization. We will focus on 
these in section 3. 
The distinction between market stan-
dards and committee standards arises 
from the circumstances of their emer-
gence. Equally important from the 
perspective of the legitimacy of stan-
dards is the degree to which their 
compliance takes on an obligatory 
nature. Standards differ in this respect. 
Some are regulative others coordina-
tive (Diagram 1).2 Regulative standards 
– often in the form of maximum or 
minimum requirements and limits – 
aim at preventing negative external-
                                                       
2 This distinction serves an analytical 
purpose. Many standards blend coordina-
tive and regulative elements. 
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ities through internalization, i.e. im-
posing the externalities on those who 
have induced them. These standards 
depend on governments or other 
political authorities to become effec-
tive within their area of jurisdiction. 
Thus, regulative standards for, say, 
environmental protection, have the 
normative character of a legal rule or 
an ordinance mandated by hierarchical 
political governance. 
Coordinative standards, such as proto-
col and interface specifications, on the 
other hand, frequently aim at promot-
ing interoperability and compatibility 
of technology in order to reduce trans-
action costs and to generate positive 
externalities. These standards cover 
economic sectors (industries) or mar-
kets for the respective technology, and 
they ignore political frontiers. Coordi-
native standards, say, a specific modu-
lation procedure, emerge in markets or 
result from voluntary agreements. 
They are similar to conventions and 
tend to be self-enforcing, i.e. they 
enjoy a considerable likelihood of 
compliance (Schmidt/Werle 1998: 119, 
120). 
Put in game-theoretic terms, coordina-
tion is often akin to the "battle of the 
sexes". Here actors strive for a com-
mon solution but initially disagree as 
to which particular solution to choose. 
Regulation, on the other hand, shows 
features of a "prisoners' dilemma" 
where incentives to cooperate are so 
weak that, as a rule, no common 
socially beneficial solution is achieved 
voluntarily (Snidal 1985). The latter 
problem can only be overcome in a 
"collaborative regime" which is based 
on enforceable agreements secured by 
hierarchical political governance. 
Coordination in contrast can be 
achieved on a voluntary basis. In this 
case a "coordinative regime" facilitates 
institutionalized self-coordination by 
providing opportunities to communi-
cate and to negotiate a common 
solution (Stein 1990).3 
The two types of standards require 
different levels of democratic legiti-
macy. It is clear that standards that are 
imposed and that thus become manda-
tory need strong democratic backing. 
                                                       
3 This distinction of coordination and 
regulation looks at costs and benefits from 
a rational perspective focusing on interest 
and utility. But regulation, often taking the 
form of legal rules or law, also engages 
normative considerations and touches 
upon social values which are symbolized 
and reinforced by these rules. "Content" 
regulation – for instance, focusing on what 
is communicated or broadcasted via the 
channels of a telecommunications network 
– is usually based on normative as well as 
economic or commercial criteria. 
 
Diagram 1: Two types of standards: An analytical distinction 
 Coordinative Regulative 
Aim Interoperability, 
compatibility 
Prevention of negative external-
ities of technology 
Mode of 
generation 
Negotiation of agreements 
among "interested" actors, 
emergence in markets 
Hierarchical political 
governance 
Normative 
character 
Convention, voluntary Legal rule, mandatory 
Area of 
validity 
Industries, markets  
(techno-economic units) 
States  
(political units) 
Economic 
effects 
Reduction of transaction 
costs, positive externalities 
Internalization of negative 
externalities 
  (Source: Werle 2002: 246) 
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Actors who benefit from the provision 
and use of a product or service will not 
be inclined to bear costs or other 
burdens which, as a side effect of their 
activities, are incurred by third parties. 
These actors, who may not even be 
aware of the negative externalities, are 
compelled by regulative standards to 
internalize the externalities. Thus, at 
first glance, these standards appear to 
be extremely precarious from the 
perspective of legitimacy. But if they 
are included in legal regulations, they 
derive their legitimacy from the na-
tional governments or the intergov-
ernmental regimes which promulgate 
the standards. Accordingly, legitimacy 
is not so much contingent on how and 
by whom a regulative standard has 
been developed (e.g. by a bureaucracy 
or by an expert committee) but rather 
on the authority of the government or 
intergovernmental organization which 
adopts the standard. 
The situation is different if political 
authorities have de-facto delegated 
regulatory power to an SDO. The "New 
Approach to Technical Harmonization" 
directive of the EU provides a case in 
point. According to this directive, 
European harmonized standards 
which include regulatory elements 
("essential requirements") are devel-
oped by European SDO and de-facto 
binding without further endorsement 
by the political authorities. Similar 
patterns have evolved in national 
standardization. But as European and 
national SDO do not have the legal 
status of independent regulatory 
agencies (Thatcher 2002) political 
authorities must be concerned about 
the legitimacy of the standardization 
process: its openness, transparency, 
and democratic pluralism (Daelemans 
1997; Egan 1998; Tamm Hallström 
2004: 11-15). 
Voluntary (coordinative) standards – 
no matter whether they were devel-
oped by an SDO or emerged in a 
market – seem to be less problematic 
than technical regulations as regards 
the requirement of democratic legiti-
macy. Formally nobody can be com-
pelled to comply with a coordinative 
standard. But this view would be too 
narrow. Some standards may be 
indirectly promulgated by governments 
or courts referencing them in legal 
regulations or judicial decisions. 
Equally important is that particularly 
in network industries such as tele-
communications and information 
technology coordinative standards can 
attain a quasi-mandatory status as a 
consequence of network effects 
(Shapiro/Varian 1999). If a standard 
becomes prevalent in such an industry, 
it may eventually lock in (Hawkins 
1999). That means that producers and 
users of a specific product or service 
may be compelled to conform to the 
prevailing standard even if they have 
implemented a different one and face 
high switching costs. In this way, a 
coordinative standard developed by an 
SDO may require legitimacy compara-
ble to a regulation despite being im-
posed through a market process.4 
 
3 Deliberation in standardization 
organizations 
Technical standards are never purely 
technical but can obscure commercial 
interests, political preferences, moral 
evaluations etc. at the same time that 
these underlying interests and choices 
are brought to bear. This ambiguity is 
again why the democratic legitimacy of 
all standards is at issue as a matter of 
principle. Following the above argu-
ment, legitimacy requirements can be 
said to differ depending on the type of 
standard in question. Regulative 
standards need a strong democratic 
legitimacy which they often derive 
from the political authority mandating 
the standard. The "burden" of achiev-
ing legitimacy rests on those who 
                                                       
4 Tamm Hallström (2004) deals with issues 
closely related to legitimacy of voluntary 
standardization in her analysis of the 
strategies of two SDO to establish author-
ity and achieve compliance with standards. 
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impose the standard and not on the 
standard's source, no matter if it is an 
SDO, a single expert or a government 
department. Only if regulatory author-
ity is delegated to an SDO the organi-
zation has to deal with legitimacy 
requirements directly. 
In the case of coordinative standards 
the legitimacy requirement diverges 
according to their source. If they 
evolve in markets in an uncontrolled 
process of spontaneous adoption by 
producers and users of technology 
nobody can be held responsible for the 
economic and social effects and the 
standards are taken for granted. If a 
dominant firm pushes a standard, this 
company may be blamed morally 
(rather than legally), but it will usually 
not be expected to endow the standard 
with legitimacy. Only if the coordina-
tive standard has been developed by 
an SDO and exerts some pressure of 
compliance the question of legitimacy 
of the standard, respectively the or-
ganization accountable for its devel-
opment, arises. 
Hence, the issue of legitimacy primar-
ily surfaces in committee processes in 
SDO. Technical standardization in a 
SDO is essentially a deliberative proc-
ess. It sets out to address a recognized 
need for collective decision-making. 
Stakeholders may allude to a need for 
improved coordination between differ-
ent parts of the value chain to reduce 
transaction costs, for a modular de-
composition of a technical system to 
provide more choices for the con-
sumer, or for new safety features to 
reduce accidents. Participants in the 
standards committee legitimize their 
preferences in collective interaction 
with other group members. Technical 
issues are always involved in the 
discussions and technical reasoning 
often guides decision-making. But 
from the angle of democratic legiti-
macy of the process and its outcome, 
the plurality of less technical concerns 
– ranging from the commercial to the 
moral – may play an equally important 
role in collective deliberations. A 
standard adopted by a committee 
exerts pressure to comply not only on 
the committee members but also on 
non-participants. In addition to this 
direct effect the standard usually has 
indirect or external effects. The direct 
and indirect effects will only be ac-
cepted or tolerated if the standardiza-
tion process is regarded as legitimate. 
How do SDO cope with the require-
ment of democratic legitimacy? If we 
look at the landscape of SDO we find 
different types of organizations which 
vary according to the geographical 
scope of their jurisdiction, their formal 
status, as well as to other features. 
SDO can be national, regional or 
international in scope and they are 
official or unofficial (informal) organi-
zations. The latter distinction is con-
tinuous rather than discrete. Further-
more, some of the national SDO have a 
regional or global significance. 
The most prominent official interna-
tional SDO (with national membership) 
are the standardization branch of the 
intergovernmental International Tele-
communication Union (ITU-T), the 
international non-governmental Inter-
national Standardization Organization 
(ISO) and its sister body, the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC). Also at the regional level we 
have official SDO such as the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI), the European Commit-
tee for Standardization (CEN) and the 
one for Electrotechnical Standardiza-
tion (CENELEC). The spectrum of 
official organizations is completed by 
national SDO which we find in all 
industrialized countries. Organizations 
such as the British Standards Institu-
tion (BSI), the Deutsches Institut für 
Normung (DIN), or the Association 
Francaise de Normalisation (AFNOR), 
are politically independent and for-
mally non-governmental organiza-
tions, but they are accredited or rec-
ognized by governments. To some 
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extent governmental recognition lends 
legitimacy to an SDO.5 
The majority of SDO are informal. They 
include national or international trade 
associations and professional organi-
zations which, besides other more 
central activities, discuss and occa-
sionally develop standards. The preva-
lence of informal standardization is 
most visibly indicated by the ever 
growing number of private consortia. 
Most of them are vendor-driven and 
many disappear once a particular 
standardization task has been finished. 
Few informal SDO have had such a 
continuous significance as the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in 
the area of Internet standardization. 
Participation in the IETF and its nu-
merous working groups is open to 
anyone and a broad and unrestricted 
discussion of proposals via electronic 
mailing lists is possible. W3C is a 
member organization which develops 
basically all standards for the web. 
Members are companies from the 
                                                       
5 Usually SDO are accredited on the condi-
tion that they provide for the representa-
tion of consumer, labour and other inter-
ests. 
industry and service sectors as well as 
research and education institutions. 
The number of SDO is still growing 
and the landscape is steadily changing. 
The headline-trend can be summarized 
as a move from regulative to coordina-
tive standards, from national to re-
gional and international standardiza-
tion and from intergovernmental and 
other official organizations to private 
consortia of standardization.6 The 
proliferation of bodies has led to a 
degree of overlapping standardization 
activities which vie with one another 
for members and for getting their 
standards adopted. This competition 
between standards and standards 
bodies tends to heighten the impor-
tance of legitimacy where it might set 
apart a standard which is perceived to 
cater to a narrow set of proponent 
interests from a competing standard 
which lays claim to serve wider inter-
ests. 
The proliferation trends indicate that 
despite undisputable diversity the SDO 
                                                       
6 Mattli argues that the trend toward 
private consortia, he calls it "private gov-
ernance" of standardization, has revealed 
limits and failings, including a lack of 
legitimacy, which have triggered moves 
toward "joint private-public governance" 
(Mattli 2003: 210). 
Diagram 2: Prevailing institutional rules of standardization organizations 
1. Participation is within certain membership rules open to those being 
substantially interested in the standards. 
2. Usually members are organizations rather than individuals. Individuals 
are regarded as "delegates" of organizations. 
3. The work is committee-based, cooperative and consensus-oriented. It 
follows formalized rules and procedures. 
4. Organization and working procedures are impartial, unsponsored and 
politically independent ("due process"). The organizations are non-profit 
organizations. 
5. The work is based on technological knowledge. It is not remunerated 
(voluntary). 
6. Most standards are non-mandatory and public goods. However, they are 
not necessarily provided to the public free of charge (but on equal 
terms). 
(Source: Werle 2001: 397) 
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show remarkable similarity concerning 
central institutional features (Diagram 
2).7 Apparently new organizations are 
designed according to the model of 
existing ones with respect to these 
features. This process of imitation and 
copying of organizational models, 
designated "mimetic isomorphism" by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991), includes 
the bylaws and charters of many 
consortia, as well as the internal 
organization of work (Werle 2001). 
The status of the standards which are 
developed by SDO is ambivalent as far 
as their legitimacy is concerned. Firms 
and users may not differentiate 
according to which organization a 
standard was adopted by as long as 
they regard a standard as beneficial 
and in this sense as "good". It is when 
the standard leads to detrimental 
effects that the legitimacy of the 
standard will be questioned. In this 
context the standard's origin and the 
democratic quality of the process of its 
development can be decisive. 
Most institutional features included in 
Diagram 2 conform to the principles of 
a democratic decision-making process 
but they do not guarantee that they are 
fulfilled. Openness to participation for 
substantially interested actors (1), for 
instance, implicitly suggests that they 
do have access to standardization. But 
in most SDO work is not remunerated 
(5) and participants incur membership 
fees and travel expenses. Thus, engag-
ing in standardization requires sub-
stantial financial resources and time. 
 
4 Input and output legitimacy 
Current changes of the landscape of 
SDO, mainly driven by the increasing 
                                                       
7 In a recent report it is maintained that in 
particular the larger long-standing consor-
tia resemble the official SDO in many 
respects (NO-REST 2005: 75 ff.). Schoechle 
takes up a more sceptical position con-
cerning the institutional similarity of 
official and informal SDO and the implica-
tions for legitimacy (2004: 149-214). 
number of consortia and the promi-
nent role standards play in the chang-
ing regulatory environment, have 
triggered what can be called a com-
petitive "market" for standards. This 
has repercussions for the strategies of 
SDO to achieve legitimacy for their 
products. We introduce the distinction 
between input and output legitimacy 
to address such strategies. 
In the literature we find different 
variants of this distinction. 
• Neo-institutional organization 
theory highlights two basic strate-
gies to achieve legitimacy (Meyer/ 
Rowan 1991). Organizations either 
put emphasis on the input and in-
ternal "production" side demon-
strating the involvement of a variety 
of actors working in accordance 
with impartial and fair procedural 
rules in an open technical dis-
course. Or the organizations focus 
on the "quality" of their products 
(output) designed to the benefit of 
the addressees or the general pub-
lic. 
• A distinction introduced in the 
debates about deliberative democ-
racy points in a similar direction. 
Institutions can involve more "ag-
gregative" or more "deliberative" ar-
rangements. The first are mainly 
based on aggregating interests 
through direct representation in the 
decision making process, while the 
latter put more emphasis on the 
justifications of collective choices 
(Cohen 1998: 186). Here organiza-
tions are required to provide the 
basis for inclusion of a pluralism of 
preferences and values. 
• Institutional political theory most 
explicitly draws on the distinction 
between input and output elements 
in terms of achieving legitimacy 
(Scharpf 1999). It is argued that 
central pillars on which input le-
gitimacy rests are direct participa-
tion of all affected by a rule (stan-
dard) and decision-making based 
on consensus. Output legitimacy, 
on the other hand, is achieved by 
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successfully dealing with problems 
which can only be collectively re-
solved. Among other things, that 
requires all interests to be consid-
ered (but not represented) in the 
definition of the collective interest. 
Thus, what is aimed at from the 
output perspective can be called 
"good" governance8 or, regarding 
standardization, "good" standards. 
Ideally, such standards would be 
beneficial or acceptable to all who 
are affected by them regardless of 
their participation in the rule-
setting process (Diagram 3). 
SDO blend input and output criteria in 
their institutional design and in their 
operations. But particularly official 
SDO have traditionally put more 
emphasis on input legitimacy. A crucial 
principle here is openness. It requires 
that all affected individuals and or-
ganizations have the opportunity to 
get involved in the decision-making 
process. But this appears feasible only 
in a local (maybe national) context. At 
                                                       
8 This concept has gained popularity in 
view of the European Union's "comitology" 
and the adoption of regulations by this 
committee system through a "deliberative" 
process in which "technical" expertise plays 
an important role (Joerges 1999). 
the regional or global level – in inter-
national standardization where most 
committee standards with a global 
significance are adopted – only a 
minority of those interested or affected 
will be able to participate directly.9 The 
question is whether this minority 
represents all those who cannot but, 
from an input perspective, should be 
present in a standardization commit-
tee. 
The official international or regional 
SDO follow the principle of territorial 
representation with national SDO or 
other national representatives being 
their members. The national "delega-
tions" are regarded as the voices and 
representatives of the aggregated and 
streamlined interests of all interested 
actors in the respective country. In 
principle, the international SDO adhere 
to the one-nation, one-vote decision 
rule which assures that every country 
(every national delegation) has a vote. 
If the question of legitimacy is limited 
to the aspect of territorial representa-
tion through national delegations and 
                                                       
9 As indicated earlier, the prohibitive costs 
incurred by those being involved in inter-
national standardization in effect exclude 
interested parties from participating in 
standardization. 
Diagram 3: Modes of achieving legitimacy in standardization 
Input legitimacy 
Focus on the "production" (standardization process) 
• Openness to and direct representation (participation) of all actors 
interested in or potentially affected by a standard 
• Work in accordance to impartial and fair procedural rules 
• Decision-making based on consensus 
Output legitimacy 
Focus on the "product" (standard) 
• All "interests" are considered (but not directly represented) in the stan-
dardization process 
• External tracking and monitoring of standardization by stakeholder 
and advocacy groups 
• Decision-making in an open inclusive discourse (arguing) to the benefit 
of all standards addressees ("good" standards) 
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if the fiction is upheld that all affected 
interests are covered by these delega-
tions the most significant require-
ments concerning input legitimacy of 
official international SDO are met. At 
the same time the burden assuring the 
involvement of diverse interests is 
shifted to the national organizations.10 
Thus, national SDO have been the first 
to be confronted by the fact that many 
organizations and individuals with a 
legitimate interest in a standard usu-
ally do not participate in standardiza-
tion despite their formal openness. 
Lack of resources, the collective action 
dilemma and other factors account for 
this deficit. This collides with the claim 
of the official SDO to develop stan-
dards which are dedicated to the 
public benefit. Early on many SDO 
tried to mitigate this deficit by involv-
ing different interests. Initially they 
stimulated user participation. But most 
users were big companies from indus-
tries such as media, finance, aerospace 
or defense and not small enterprises or 
consumers. In the 1970s, the SDO 
started efforts to promote the involve-
ment of consumer, labor and later also 
environmental interests in standardi-
zation. Since the early 1990s, consum-
ers have been represented in practi-
cally all national SDO in the industrial-
ized world (Schepel/Falke 2000: 101ff). 
In many countries consumer represen-
tation is directly or indirectly finan-
cially supported by governments and 
also stipulated if the SDO want to be 
officially recognized. Typically special 
                                                       
10 An official "Statement on Consumer 
Participation in Standardization Work" 
issued by ISO/IEC in 2001 illustrates this 
tendency to shift responsibility to the 
national level. ISO/IEC recognizes that "the 
interests of governments, manufacturers, 
all categories of users and consumers, and 
any others concerned, should be taken into 
account" and stipulates that "delegations to 
technical committee meetings should be in 
a position to represent all interests within 
their respective countries." 
<www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/ 
otherpubs/pdf/copolcoparticipation_2001-
en.pdf> 
consumer councils or consumer com-
mittees are established which monitor 
consumer relevant standardization 
work, investigate consumer concerns 
and develop standards proposals on 
this basis. That means on the other 
hand that representatives of consumer 
interests usually do not directly par-
ticipate in the deliberations of a stan-
dards committee. 
Compared to consumer interests the 
representation of other non-industry 
interests is less well institutionalized. 
The northern European countries as 
well as Germany and France who to 
some extent share a corporatist tradi-
tion, provide arrangements for the 
involvement of trade unions in stan-
dardization while such arrangements 
are lacking in other countries (Schepel/ 
Falke 2000: 123). Mainly in Germany 
where, in 1975, the Trade Union Fed-
eration (DGB) called for a "democratic" 
process of standards development 
"some major progress" can be ob-
served concerning labor interests 
representation especially if occupa-
tional health and safety issues are at 
stake. But out of some 26,000 experts 
involved in standards committees of 
the German DIN only one tenth of a 
percent represent employees (Bamberg 
2003). Without financial support by the 
German government, representation 
would be even weaker. 
Yet less favorable is the situation at the 
national level to environmental inter-
ests. In a few countries officials from 
environmental offices or ministries 
participate in standardization. In rare 
cases representatives of environmental 
groups are involved in the work of 
technical committees. The German 
DIN set up a coordination office for 
environmental protection. This office, 
funded by the government, examines 
standards at the draft stage 
(Schepel/Falke 2000: 126). 
This illustration indicates that issues 
of territorial representation are irrele-
vant at the national level. Rather a 
kind of functional representation with 
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an origin in corporatist thinking is 
seen to facilitate achieving legitimacy 
(Voelzkow 1996). The involvement in 
standardization of a variety of non-
industry interests, in the first place 
consumer, to some degree also labour 
interests, has gained importance, 
whereas environmentalists have to 
struggle to create awareness in stan-
dardization. Other interests and per-
spectives play an even weaker role. 
Given these asymmetries at the na-
tional level one cannot expect national 
SDO to provide regional or interna-
tional SDO with unbiased input. But 
these organizations have increasingly 
ceased to rely on national input any-
way. In particular in ICT, the tradi-
tional bottom-up process of feeding 
national standards into supranational 
committees which then negotiate an 
international standard on this basis 
has been undermined by the shift of 
generic standardization to regional 
and international SDO (Büthe/Witte 
2004). At the same time standardiza-
tion has moved towards the early 
stages of technological design (ex-ante 
standardization). At the working level – 
where standards are developed, tested 
and negotiated – the regional and 
international SDO have abolished the 
principle of territorial representation 
and are open to direct membership of 
firms, R&D institutes, business asso-
ciations, government departments and 
other corporate actors. National SDO 
only transpose into national standards 
what has been developed internation-
ally. As a consequence the regional 
and international SDO have to respond 
to legitimacy requirements of the same 
type as the national SDO and they do 
so in the same way emphasizing 
functional representation and open-
ness. But the barriers to including 
non-industry interests are even higher 
at the supranational than at the na-
tional level. 
Again consumers' interests are more 
effectively represented than other non-
industry interests. In Europe where the 
European Commission has tradition-
ally mandated many standards and 
tried to shape the institutional land-
scape of standardization the Commis-
sion contributes to funding the Euro-
pean Association for the Co-ordination 
of Consumer Representation in Stan-
dardization (ANEC) which is based on 
a network of more than 200 consumer 
representatives across Europe. ANEC is 
an associated member of the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN). 
At the international level the ISO set 
up the Committee on Consumer Policy 
(COPOLCO) in 1978 "to ensure that the 
voice of the consumer is heard in the 
development of standards" by selecting 
areas that are of priority to consumers 
and coordinating participation of 
consumer representatives in the tech-
nical committees developing standards 
in these areas.11 
Labour interests in standardization are 
often represented by trade unions. At 
the European level unions mainly 
focus on health and safety standards 
which are often mandated by the 
European Commission and have the 
character of binding regulations. In 
1989, the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) set up a Techni-
cal Bureau for Health and Safety 
(TUTB) which became an associated 
member of CEN in 1993.12 
Participation of environmental groups 
in European standardization has a 
rather short history. Early efforts of the 
European Environmental Bureau 
(EEB), a Federation of Environmental 
Citizens Organizations, to get involved 
in standardization failed, partly due to 
a lack of funding by the European 
Commission of a technical bureau 
which was designed to organize direct 
                                                       
11 <www.iso.org/iso/en/comms-markets/ 
consumers/iso+theconsumer-04.html> 
12 In April 2005, the TUTB merged with the 
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and 
the European Trade Union College (ETUCO) 
– to become the European Trade Union 
Institute for Research, Education and 
Health and Safety (ETUI-REHS). Now this 
new organization is an associated member 
of CEN. 
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involvement of environmentalists in 
standardization. Instead, the European 
Environmental Citizens Organisations 
for Standardisation (ECOS) were 
awarded an EU contract, starting on 
November 1, 2002, which facilitates 
the coordination of input of environ-
mental organizations into standards 
work. ECOS is a membership organiza-
tion, open to non governmental or-
ganizations (NGO) active at a Euro-
pean or a national level. Assisted by 
the EEB, ECOS sends experts to tech-
nical committees and working groups 
of the European SDO. It is associated 
member of CEN and cooperating 
partner of CENELEC.13 At the interna-
tional level we find, for instance, IEC's 
Advisory Committee on Environmental 
Aspects (ACEA) which was created in 
1994. In a recently published docu-
ment ACEA draws the attention of the 
designers of electrotechnical products 
to the need to integrate environmental 
aspects into the product design. An-
other document concerning the inclu-
sion of environmental aspects into 
product standards explicitly addresses 
the technical committees which de-
velop them.14 
 
5 Toward output legitimacy 
Different formats have been chosen by 
the SDO to facilitate participation of 
consumer, employee, and environ-
mental groups in standardization. In 
some instances, group representatives 
have direct access to the committees 
in which the detailed standardization 
work is done. In other cases special 
committees have been set up in the 
SDO to monitor and track the stan-
dardization work and to provide input 
                                                       
13 <www.ecostandard.org/ 
about_who_we_are.php> 
14 IEC Guide 114: "Environmentally con-
scious design – Integrating environmental 
aspects into design and development of 
electrotechnical products" (Geneva, 2005) 
and IEC Guide 109: "Environmental aspects 
– Inclusion in electrotechnical product 
standards" (Geneva, 2003). 
into the working committee process if 
and when it appears necessary. Again 
in other cases, experts from consumer, 
employee or environmental groups are 
members of the boards of standardiza-
tion organizations where they have the 
opportunity to draw attention to the 
interests and values they represent but 
cannot feed them directly into the 
standardization work. 
But consumer groups and, to a greater 
degree, the other groups stress the 
lack of funds and other resources as a 
continuing obstacle to effective par-
ticipation in standardization (Sche-
pel/Falke 2000: 111-127). Another 
problem is the narrow focus of exper-
tise of most experts who are delegated 
by a consumer, environmental or 
employee group into a standardization 
committee. Usually not all aspects of a 
standard are covered by a single ex-
pert. More serious is the issue of 
appropriate representation of the 
groups' interests and perspectives 
because it is difficult to establish that 
the view presented by the expert who 
represents a group is in fact the collec-
tive view (Hawkins 1995). As a conse-
quence direct involvement of experts 
from consumer, employee and envi-
ronmental groups in the SDO often 
fails to meet the expectations these 
groups associate with it. 
Direct participation in the process of 
standards development and, if possi-
ble, also proportional representation 
by the participants of the plurality of 
non-industry interests and values 
would perfectly meet the requirements 
of input legitimacy. There is broad 
consensus that without public funding 
and other support, non-industry 
interests would not be represented in 
the standardization process at all. But 
one can have doubts that further 
efforts to "pro-actively support 
participation of relevant stakeholders 
in standardisation work at the 
national, European, and international 
levels" will really have the effect 
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expected by the European Commission 
and other political authorities.15 A look 
at standards development for the 
Internet confirms this view. Internet 
standardization has established itself 
completely detached from the official 
SDO as well as from the prevailing 
industry standards for networks 
(David/Werle 2000). The Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) is more 
open and inclusive than any other 
official or informal SDO (Froomkin 
2003). Only individuals (and not firms 
or other organizations) can be "mem-
bers" of the IETF and most of the work 
is done via inexpensive electronic 
means of communication. But the 
expectation that these features attract 
many individuals with non-technical 
and non-industry interests and con-
cerns has been disappointed. "By and 
large, vendors, service providers, and 
to a lesser extent, academia dominate 
the lists and the meetings" while users, 
for instance, "are as under-represented 
on the distribution lists and at the 
meetings as they are on ITU-T and OSI 
committees" (Jakobs 2000: 157). 
Thus, achieving legitimacy through 
direct participation in standards com-
mittees is not only contingent on the 
openness of an SDO and the availabil-
ity of public funding but also on the 
prevailing rules and principles govern-
ing the process of the development of 
standards. Of special interest in this 
context is the consensus principle 
which guides decision-making at the 
working level of standardization and is 
shared by virtually all official and 
informal SDO (see above Diagram 2). 
Consensus, essential for input legiti-
macy, is difficult to accomplish. Al-
though it is not the same as unanimity 
and practices have evolved in many 
SDO to arrive at consensus this princi-
ple affords veto power to every indi-
                                                       
15 General guidelines for the cooperation 
between CEN, CENELEC AND ETSI and the 
European Commission and The European 
Free Trade Association 28 March 2003. 
Official Journal of the EU 2003/c 91/04: 7-
11, p. 10. 
vidual involved. Thus, a tension be-
tween legitimacy through consensus 
and efficiency in terms of adopting 
many standards quickly is undisputa-
ble (Rada 2000).16 The more diverse the 
interests involved in a standards 
committee are the more difficult it is to 
forge consensus. This is one reason 
why several informal SDO, consortia in 
particular, target industrial parties but 
hesitate to involve other stakeholders 
and participants as they might increase 
diversity (Werle 2001). But also in this 
respect the difference between official 
and informal SDO is one of degree 
rather than principle (Egyedi 2001). 
The obstacles to direct participation of 
non-industry interests are multiplied if 
not only stakeholders such as con-
sumers or labor but also civil liberties 
organizations and public interest 
groups are to be involved in standardi-
zation – a requirement that suggests 
itself from the point of view of the 
legitimacy of standards.17 More than 
consumer or employee groups these 
organizations strive for technical 
solutions including standards which 
secure openness of technical systems, 
help protect privacy and provide for 
"democratic" elements in the design of 
technical systems in particular in ICT. 
Adding public interests groups to the 
circle of actors actively involved in 
                                                       
16 New participants in the working groups 
of the IETF read the following instructions: 
"The general rule on disputed topics is that 
the Working Group has to come to 'rough 
consensus', meaning that a very large 
majority of those who care must agree. The 
exact method of determining rough con-
sensus varies from Working Group to 
Working Group. The lack of voting has 
caused some very long delays for some 
proposals, but most IETF participants who 
have witnessed rough consensus after 
acrimonious debates feel that the delays 
often result in better protocols." 
(<www.ietf.org/tao.html#9.1>) 
17 Stakeholders are understood here as 
persons or groups with a direct economic 
interest, involvement, or investment in 
something, for example, the employees, 
shareholders, and customers of a com-
pany. 
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standardization increases the inclu-
siveness and the democratic quality of 
the process. The heterogeneity of 
interests and values is appreciated 
from a legitimacy perspective but if 
they are directly involved in standardi-
zation the result may be inefficiency, 
delay and deadlock of the process. 
Also, affected companies may try to 
bypass the respective SDO and turn to 
more exclusive ones. 
A response of many SDO to this prob-
lem has been to put more emphasis on 
output than on input legitimacy of 
standardization. What counts at the 
end of the day is to issue standards 
which are accepted by the addressees 
or the general public as beneficial or at 
least as not harmful no matter how the 
details of the standardization process 
have been shaped. However, consider-
ing the possible positive and negative 
externalities of a standard, the "market 
test" (diffusion in the market) is not 
sufficient to establish its benefit. 
Developing a "good" standard requires 
facilitating access to SDO of as many 
diverse interests and values as neces-
sary to assure that all relevant techni-
cal, commercial, socio-economic and 
socio-political aspects are appropri-
ately taken into account. But it does 
not require that they are directly  and 
proportionally represented in the 
standardization process by advocates 
and other representatives of these 
interests and values. 
Although we claim here to observe 
tendencies of many SDO to put em-
phasis on achieving output legitimacy, 
we are not arguing that this indicates 
an encompassing general trend. It 
would also be misleading to infer that 
the SDO acknowledge a kind of func-
tional imperative if they shift emphasis 
into this direction. Rather external 
pressure originating from three 
sources has been exerted on them, 
especially on the official SDO, to more 
explicitly consider the legitimacy of 
their standards and search for an 
adequate strategy to cope with this 
requirement. 
1. In the first place policymakers and 
regulators have called for strength-
ening the legitimacy of standards. 
One step has been that many coun-
tries require formal public inquiries 
during the adoption of national 
standards by the official SDO. Also, 
in particular in the EU – resulting 
from the New Approach to Techni-
cal Harmonisation (in 1985) which 
spelled out that harmonized stan-
dards virtually always include regu-
latory components – the official 
SDO had to formally recognize the 
need to involve public interests into 
the standard setting process. As 
early as 1984, this was put forth in 
a joint memorandum between the 
political authorities and CEN and 
CENELEC. But the way of how to 
involve "public authorities, manu-
facturers, users, consumers, trade 
unions" and other groups effectively 
in the drawing up of European 
standards was left open.18 
2. More general pressures can be 
associated with the dynamic market 
for standards.19 The efficiency ar-
gument traditionally made to le-
gitimize streamlining the standardi-
zation process by circumventing 
"superfluous" interests has to a cer-
tain degree been turned around. 
Initially competitive pressures have 
made a standard in line with con-
sumer preferences more successful 
on this market than one that re-
flects the narrower commercial in-
terests of business. Recent devel-
opments in ICT suggest that stan-
dards which have been adopted in a 
                                                       
18 General Guidelines for Cooperation 
between the European Commission and 
CEN and CENELEC, agreed on 13 Novem-
ber 1984, and published as CEN/CENELEC 
Memorandum No 4. <www.cenorm.be/ 
boss/production/production+processes+-
+index/candidate+harmonized+standards
/cclcgd004.pdf> 
19 A qualified indication is that there are 
around 400 standards bodies currently in 
operation. See the Consortium and Stan-
dards List at 
<www.consortiuminfo.org/links/> 
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more pluralist environment are per-
ceived as equitable and therefore 
more appealing on this market. 
3. A third set of pressures involves the 
activities of advocacy and interest 
groups. The advent of such grass-
root civil liberties and public inter-
est groups is linked to the emer-
gence of ICT systems and their po-
tential opportunities and risks. 
They have directed attention to 
technical standards which coordi-
nate and regulate the development 
and use of the systems. These 
groups and their interests and val-
ues could no longer be ignored by 
the SDO which organizationally re-
sponded in various ways to these 
new pressures. 
 
6 Reframing standardization 
Achieving output legitimacy requires 
successfully integrating a great plural-
ity of interests and values in the stan-
dardization process without necessar-
ily requiring the direct participation of 
the respective stakeholders and advo-
cates. This means that in effect the 
cognitive and normative frame in 
which the deliberations on standards 
take place must be broadened. 
That the cognitive and normative 
frame of a collective decision-making 
process has an influence on the out-
come has been shown in many ex-
perimental and "real world" studies in 
different traditions of social theory. In 
Goffman's seminal analysis frames are 
defined as basic cognitive structures 
which guide the perception of reality. 
They are adopted in a communicative 
process (cf. Goffman 1974). Frames 
promote particular problem 
definitions, causal interpretations and 
moral evaluations and they influence 
individual and collective decisions. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1985) 
demonstrate the behavioral effects of 
different frames in experiments which 
show that economic choices are 
controlled by the formulation of a 
problem as well as by habits, norms 
and values. In the early 1990s, frame 
analysis made inroads in policy 
studies. Frames are seen as 
constituting policy issues and at the 
same time providing guideposts for 
analyzing, persuading and acting on 
them (Rein/Schön 1993). Frames can 
change in discursive deliberations but 
in a stable institutional setting a new 
dominant frame does not replace 
previously legitimate frames (cf. Surel 
2000). 
For a long time, the cognitive frame of 
the standards developing process was 
a technical one. Standardization was 
perceived as a search process aiming 
at finding the technically optimal 
solution which then was easy to agree 
upon. The technical discourse among 
engineers prevailed and non-technical 
arguments tended to be considered 
illegitimate. Since the 1970s, this 
discourse has increasingly been 
supplemented in some and 
marginalized in other SDO by a 
business oriented commercial 
discourse.20 Strategic commercial 
interests are argued in light of firm-
level capabilities, complementary 
assets, any installed consumer-base, 
and of course the prospect of new 
customers. Thus, competitive concerns 
and profit interests are generally 
regarded as legitimate by the actors 
participating in standardization 
(Schmidt/Werle 1998). This shows that 
it is possible, in principle, to change 
the cognitive and normative frame of 
the standardization discourse and it 
has encouraged SDO to try to include 
other elements which direct the 
standards committees' attention to-
ward non-technical and non-
commercial issues. 
The SDO gathered some experience 
with environmental implications of 
                                                       
20 An indication that the technical discourse 
has still some relevance is provided by the 
IETF's widely cited philosophy: "We reject 
kings, presidents, and voting; we believe in 
rough consensus and running code." In 
this reading standardization is about 
finding not necessarily the best but a 
technically reasonable ("running") solution. 
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standards which, if at all, are usually 
revealed in a late stage of the devel-
opment of a standard – too late to 
intervene in the process. As a conse-
quence SDO such as the DIN in Ger-
many or the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) established an 
Environmental Helpdesk with the task 
to advice and support the standardiza-
tion committees considering environ-
mental aspects. CEN has issued "Envi-
ronmental Guidelines" to ensure the 
best possible incorporation of envi-
ronmental aspects.21 It is emphasized 
by CEN that the integration of envi-
ronmental aspects in standards is a 
voluntary instrument to achieve envi-
ronmental goals. But at the same time 
CEN requests that "every work item 
should include an assessment of the 
environmental aspects as early as 
possible in the process. It should 
preferably be done between the stage 
of approval of a work item and the 
stage of circulation of a first document 
at the latest, in order to avoid delays in 
standardization process."22 We already 
mentioned comparable developments 
at the international level but what we 
want to emphasize here is that SDO 
continuously try to feed environmental 
aspects into the cognitive and norma-
tive frame of the standardization 
process. These efforts are reinforced 
by a significantly growing public 
interest for the environment. 
Another notable attempt – initiated by 
public policy agents – aims at integrat-
ing the specific needs of "minorities" 
such as handicapped people in the 
standardization process. Traditional 
design of technology in effect excludes 
the handicapped. On the other hand 
                                                       
21 The CEN "Guide for the inclusion of 
environmental aspects in product stan-
dards" (Guide 4) was issued in 1998 and 
revised in 2004. 
22 CEN: Guidance – Consideration of 
environmental aspects in standards, 
version 1 (January 2005) 
<www.cenorm.be/boss/supporting/guidanc
e+documents/gd050+-+environmental 
+aspects+in+standards/index.asp> 
the group of the handicapped and their 
needs are very heterogeneous, because 
this category spans a wide range of 
individuals from those with impaired 
vision, to those with different types of 
other functional disabilities. For that 
reason direct participation of handi-
capped in standardization would 
always imply selective rather than 
encompassing representation. 
In several countries public agencies 
support relevant research and devel-
opment and influence companies to 
consider these needs in the design and 
standardization of technology. One 
case in point is Norway which 
launched the "Information Technology 
for the Disabled (IT Funk)" program. 
This long term attempt shall affect 
standardization at the national and the 
supranational level in order to improve 
the conditions for the disabled mainly 
in terms of accessibility to ICT systems 
and services.23 The other Scandinavian 
countries are involved in similar ac-
tions. The "Danish Centre for Assistive 
Technology" provides input into ETSI, 
CEN and ISO and tracks 
standardization processes from the 
angle of the needs of handicapped 
people. All Nordic countries run 
laboratories which test products but 
also propose European standards from 
this angle and provide feedback into 
standardization.24 
Official SDO, in particular, have 
reacted to the emerging initiatives and 
pressures by either issuing guidelines 
for standard-makers on how to take 
into account the needs of disabled 
people25 or setting up a special 
committee which is responsible for 
guidelines and standards that deal 
with requirements of disabled people 
(ETSI HF). 
                                                       
23 <www.itfunk.org/docs/engpres.html> 
24 <www.hmi.dk/index.asp?id=482> 
25 See Guidelines for standards developers 
to address the needs of older persons and 
persons with disabilities (ISO/IEC Guide 71, 
2001) and the European equivalent issued 
by CEN/CENELEC (Guide 6, 2001).  
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More recent developments indicate 
that awareness creation has shifted to 
the encompassing issue of how the 
interests and needs of all types of 
minority groups linked to the use of 
technology can be considered in 
standardization. Efforts in this direc-
tion emphasize the "design for all" 
principle. If this principle is taken into 
account in the standards development 
process the likelihood increases that 
the resulting standards are acceptable 
to all who are directly or indirectly 
affected by them. They may even help 
avoiding problems such as computer 
illiteracy and the "digital divide". The 
idea to influence the design of tech-
nology by promoting design for all 
principles in standardization emerged 
in the USA in the 1960s. The American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
adopted "universal design" principles 
in 1961. In the following decades the 
idea slowly diffused to Europe and 
South-East Asia. A new bibliography 
on design for all principles indicates 
that more than 50 documents of 
different types produced by official 
supranational SDO address ways to 
include such principles in the delibera-
tion on standards (Olsson/Lyhne 
2005). 
ANEC and other consumer associa-
tions strongly support design for all 
priorities. These principles have a root 
in consumerism but they are also 
rooted in the US civil rights movement. 
Based on the tradition of these move-
ments new civil society and public 
interests groups have emerged which 
have become aware of the societal 
significance of technical standards. 
The Internet, in particular, has stimu-
lated a broad debate regarding the 
democratic legitimacy of standardiza-
tion in the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) and the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) (Froomkin 2003; 
Russell 2003). More than in other 
contexts of standardization, general 
aspects of democracy rather than 
special consumer, employee or envi-
ronmental interests are emphasized in 
this debate. Among the few public 
interests and civil society groups 
which highlight the significance of 
standardization is the Center for 
Democracy and Technology (CDT). 
This advocacy group has most actively 
struggled for the consideration of 
individual civil rights and civil society 
values in Internet standardization. In 
1996, the CDT set up the Internet 
Privacy Working Group which initiated 
the development of technical privacy 
specifications in the W3C. Some mem-
bers of the working group participated 
in developing the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P) standard.26 
In an analysis of the experience gath-
ered during this activity – but also in 
several cases in the IETF – the CDT 
points to the limitations of direct 
participation of public interest advo-
cates in standardization (Davidson et 
al. 2002; Morris/Davidson 2003). Direct 
ongoing participation is regarded to be 
most effective, as in the case of P3P, 
but extremely time and resource 
intensive and, thus, not feasible as a 
standard operating procedure. But also 
the less resource-consuming ad hoc 
mode of participation is considered to 
be of limited usefulness because the 
public interest advocates retain the 
role of an outsider whose suggestions 
can easily be dismissed by the commit-
tee. An alternative to direct participa-
tion is seen in monitoring and tracking 
the work of standards committees by 
the public interest community. The 
CDT developed instructions ("ritualized 
public policy impact assessments") to 
be followed if standardization proc-
esses are monitored. This and other 
documents – characteristic of the 
efforts to broaden the cognitive and 
normative frame of standardization – 
aim at creating awareness of potential 
policy impacts of standards. They 
address different areas of public policy 
                                                       
26 This standardized technology communi-
cates the privacy policies of web sites to 
the users that connect to them (Cranor 
2002). 
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concern, ranging from "Content Cen-
sorship and Control" to "Personal 
Privacy."27 They shall be addressed by 
the standard developers when they 
design new technologies. 
Taken together, these illustrations 
indicate that broadening the cognitive 
and normative frame of standardiza-
tion is a promising option for SDO in a 
situation in which they have started to 
stress output legitimacy in response to 
the pressure to strengthen the legiti-
macy of standards. Reshaping the 
normative and cognitive frame of 
standardization is in itself a delibera-
tive process in which ideally individu-
als with diverse interests, preferences 
and values should be involved (Ham-
lett 2003: 132). But this appears unfea-
sible in standardization, especially at 
the European and international level. 
Strategies to create advisory groups 
which monitor and occasionally inter-
vene into the work of standardization 
committees and to issue guidelines 
which draw attention to issues usually 
not considered by these committees 
are at least one step toward reframing 
standardization. A broadened cognitive 
and normative frame makes it possible 
– but by no means guarantees – that 
non-industry interests and values are 
considered. They are not directly 
represented in the standardization 
committees but may be "invoked" by 
the members (cf. Feng 2005). 
 
7 Conclusion 
Adopting technical standards makes 
up a crucial step in the process of 
developing technology. It often takes 
place in company labs hidden from the 
public. A significant number of stan-
dards are developed in SDO. Company 
standards provide input into this 
process. They are voluntarily disclosed 
because the companies expect to 
                                                       
27 Concerning the work of the IETF: Public 
Policy Considerations for Internet Design 
Decisions <www.cdt.org/standards/draft-
morris-policy-considerations-00.pdf> 
benefit from the agreement on a 
common standard in the SDO. Partici-
pation in standards development is 
time-consuming, resource-intensive 
and requires technical expertise. Taken 
together it is not surprising that the 
majority of participants in standardiza-
tion are agents of firms. Given the 
plurality of interests and values in 
society these agents are definitely not 
representative. The bias towards 
industry interest representation is – 
with few exceptions – strongest at the 
international level, where even small 
and medium-sized enterprises are 
absent, not to mention non-industry 
interests and values. The SDO are 
aware that this bias calls the legiti-
macy of standards into question – 
regulative (mandatory) and coordina-
tive (voluntary) standards alike. 
The institutional rules of committee 
standardization, in particular the 
relative openness and transparency of 
the process, in principle, attract par-
ticipation by actors and groups inter-
ested in or affected by a standard. But 
without public funding and without 
pressure on the SDO consumer, em-
ployee and environmental as well as 
minority, civil society and public policy 
interests would usually not be consid-
ered in standardization. 
Two (not mutually exclusive) options 
are available to achieve legitimacy of 
standardization by including non-
industry interest and values. One 
option is to put emphasis on the input 
side of the process trying to balance 
interest and value representation 
through direct participation of all 
affected or interested groups. Apart 
from the high costs, direct participa-
tion would likely result in complexity 
overload and deadlock in the commit-
tees which are expected to decide on 
the basis of consensus. The overloaded 
SDO would be bypassed by industry 
and standardization would migrate 
from official and de-facto recognized 
informal SDO such as the World Wide 
Web Consortium into exclusive private 
consortia. 
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Partly because of these problems – but 
also partly as a consequence of an 
increasing number of interest and 
advocacy groups which claim to be 
directly or indirectly affected by the 
standards – the SDO have started to 
shift emphasis toward output legiti-
macy. The efforts to arrive at standards 
beneficial or acceptable to all affected 
vary with regard to their specific start-
ing-point. But they share the aim to 
stimulate participants in standards 
developing processes to consider 
potential non-market and non-
technical impacts of standards. They 
aim at broadening the cognitive and 
normative frame of the standardization 
discourse and creating awareness of a 
standard's implications without requir-
ing direct participation of advocates 
and representatives of non-industry 
interests and values. This is mainly 
facilitated by guidelines for standards 
committees which promote the inclu-
sion of non-market interests and 
values into the standardization dis-
course. In addition, special committees 
from outside or special boards within 
the SDO monitor and review the work 
of the standards committees and 
return an assessment to them. The 
ultimate aim of all these measures is 
creating good standards endowed with 
some form of democratic legitimacy. 
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Abstract 
The main ethical principle in prenatal testing is the autonomous decision of the 
pregnant woman concerned. However, recent developments in prenatal testing 
undermine this model. The overall number of invasive* prenatal examinations has 
dropped significantly. Yet, the amount of pathologic results has increased. Due to 
the improvement in ultrasound diagnostics the predictability of possible disabilities 
or diseases of the unborn child has increased substantially. As a result of this 
pregnant women can take the decision whether or not to undergo invasive prena-
tal examinations on the basis of personal risk "evidence" produced earlier on by 
means of non-invasive* screening. It can be questioned, how autonomous deci-
sions can be if they are increasingly pre-informed through upstream risk-
assessments on the basis of non-invasive screening. Particularly ultrasound 
screening is often carried out without thorough counselling and sometimes even 
without consent. The concept of autonomy is difficult to uphold if women do not 
deliberately decide whether to undergo non-invasive screening, but the moment of 
such a deliberate decision comes only after positive screening results. Taking into 
account that public discourses have rather focused on other aspects of genetic or 
reproductive technologies such as stem cell research or pre-implantation diagnosis 
it is important to analyse how technological innovations transform medical prac-
tices without a re-articulation on a discursive level as I will try to show in this 
paper for the case of prenatal testing.1 
                                                       
* Medical terms are explained in the glossary and marked with a * sign when first used in 
the text. 
1 Acknowledgement: The issues discussed in this paper were investigated in a research 
project called "Prenatal Testing: Individual Decision or Distributed Action" that was carried 
out by the author and his colleagues within the accompanying research programme (ELSA) 
within the Austrian Genome Research Programme (GEN-AU) funded by the Austrian Federal 
Ministry for Education, Science and Culture. 
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1 Introduction 
It is generally assumed that in the 
current medical practice, prenatal 
testing requires genetic counselling*. 
In particular this is true for so called 
invasive (or diagnostic) methods such 
as amniocentesis* and chorionic villus 
sampling (CVS)*. This counselling is to 
secure the individual and autonomous 
decision of the pregnant women 
concerned. It is she and only she who 
should decide matters of prenatal 
testing. Not least for that reason, 
genetic counselling plays a key role in 
prenatal testing and has become an 
obligatory requirement in the proce-
dure. The main task for the counsellor 
is now to give proper information on 
the subject. This is to inform the 
client's decision and to provide medi-
cal knowledge that a pregnant woman 
may not possess. A counsellor will be 
keen to talk about the implications of 
available examinations, possible risks 
they include and their potential out-
comes. Experienced counsellors em-
phasise the importance of stressing 
that prenatal testing is not a guarantee 
for a healthy child and that there are 
certain limits to such examinations 
that anybody who undergoes them 
must be aware of.2 Furthermore, it has 
become a standard that prenatal 
testing will only be performed if a 
pregnant woman has given her explicit 
agreement to the procedure, confirm-
ing that she has received comprehen-
sive information and has decided after 
thorough consideration thereof. 
This framework of prenatal testing 
refers to specific ethical standards, 
which are largely shared among coun-
sellors and physicians in the field (c.f. 
Wertz/Fletcher 1989: 28 and 2004: 36-
43).3 These principles aim to give 
                                                       
2 Based on interview data as conducted by 
the author. 
3 Non-directiveness in genetic counselling 
is a concept that reaches highest accep-
tance among counsellors. In a survey on 
geneticists in 19 nations more than 75% of 
those surveyed agreed to this standard in 
highest priority to the woman's right to 
decide for herself. There are certain 
measures to ensure that all decisions 
are left to the client. Most importantly 
this is through so-called "non-
directiveness" in counselling. In short 
this means that the physician should 
serve as an informant, but must not 
influence or prejudge decisions in one 
way or another. This way "informed 
consent"* should be achieved. All 
together: "The counsellor-client rela-
tionship is based on values of care and 
respect for the client's autonomy, 
identity, welfare and freedom" (NSGC 
1991). 
It has been argued elsewhere (c.f. 
Clarke 1991: 1000; Marini et al. 2002: 
171; Wertz/Fletcher 2004: 38) that in 
practice it is not so easy to actually 
come close to this ideal. But despite all 
the difficulties in applying these ethical 
standards, they still remain the domi-
nant reference point for physicians and 
counsellors in prenatal testing. How-
ever, some have taken a critical view of 
the underlying individualism. Elisabeth 
Beck-Gernsheim for example has 
argued that the opportunity to decide 
is also an obligation to do so. In fact 
the possibility to not decide no longer 
exists (Beck-Gernsheim 1990: 157; 
Beck 1990: 52). A personal decision 
becomes inescapable. But, whoever 
decides is responsible for what follows 
from that decision. It can be argued 
that there is a specific coupling be-
tween individual decision and personal 
responsibility. 
Undoubtedly the guiding vision of an 
"autonomous decision" in prenatal 
testing is a powerful driving force that 
shapes clinical practice to the present 
day. However, in this article I will 
                                                                 
more than 75% of the investigated coun-
tries (c.f. Wertz/Fletcher 1989: 28). Having 
investigated 36 nations in 1993-95 Wertz 
and Fletcher point to the fact that "unbi-
ased information" is a guiding norm for 
English-speaking nations in particular and 
similarly important for northern and 
western European countries (c.f. 
Wertz/Fletcher 2004: 36-43). 
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argue that medical practice is not 
exclusively a matter of social construc-
tions. In particular I will question how 
independent such a decision or in-
formed consent actually is. For that 
reason it is the role of the medical 
technologies that is examined more 
carefully. To what extent do the testing 
methods applied exercise an influence 
on prenatal testing? In providing an 
answer to this question it can be 
shown how technological innovations 
contribute to the re-organization of 
medical practices. 
 
2 Methodology 
The argument presented in this paper 
is based on an empirical study carried 
out by the author and his colleagues. 
The study aims to examine the individ-
ual character of decisions in the 
course of prenatal testing and focuses 
on processes that contribute to an 
individualization of responsibility for 
decisions in the context of prenatal 
examinations. Among other research 
methods we have carried out expert 
interviews with physicians (geneticists 
and gynaecologists) who perform 
prenatal testing. 
Purposive sampling was used to obtain 
a sample of 15 experts in prenatal 
testing. We have chosen interviewees 
who work in the major centres for 
prenatal testing in Austria. With one 
exception we could carry out inter-
views with physicians from all the 
centres for prenatal testing who run a 
cytogenetic* laboratory. In addition we 
interviewed physicians from a province 
which does not have a cytogenetic 
laboratory on its own, but send there 
samples elsewhere for analysis. One 
geneticist was interviewed who does 
not carry out prenatal testing anymore, 
but has done so previously. Ten of our 
interviewees are gynaecologists who 
carry out the prenatal tests in co-
operation with one of the cytogenetic 
laboratories or have one in their own 
department. 
Semi-structured guideline based 
interviews were carried out by mem-
bers of the research team and were 
audio-taped and transcribed. The 
interviews were carried out in the 
offices of the interviewees and were 
typically one to one hour and a half 
long. All interviewees were informed 
about the purpose of the interview and 
asked for consent to using the material 
for our study. For the qualitative 
analysis we used a software for data 
management and analysis (atlas.ti). 
In the course of the interviews our 
interviewees provided us with data of 
the tests they have performed. In this 
paper I will analyse these data on the 
frequency of the tests, the indications* 
they were induced, and the number of 
positive results. The analysis is in-
formed by the expertise of the inter-
viewees who explained the data to the 
interviewer. However, it needs to be 
mentioned that there are no consistent 
data on the total number of prenatal 
tests on a national level. Data are only 
available from the centres which offer 
such tests and willing to open up to 
social scientists. The figures presented 
in this paper are data of a particular 
centre, which can be regarded as a 
typical case. The centre is of national 
importance and one of the largest in 
the country. Our interviewees of the 
other centres observe a similar picture 
in their own context and confirm the 
trend we present here in the interviews 
we have taken. On this basis it is 
claimed that the presented findings 
give an appropriate account of prena-
tal testing in Austria. 
The developments described in this 
paper can also be observed in other 
countries (e.g. Wray et al. 2005, 
Benn/Fang/Egan 2005 for the USA). 
However, it is difficult to generalize the 
practice of prenatal testing. The na-
tional health care systems are different 
and they provide different circum-
stances for antenatal care accordingly. 
Diffusion patterns of medical tech-
nologies vary from one country to 
another and also legal frameworks are 
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unlike to name a few parameters, 
which make it difficult to compare or 
even generalize. For that reason this 
paper does only claim to provide an 
analysis for Austria. On the other 
hand, medical science is highly inter-
nationalised and medical technologies 
are commercialised on a global mar-
ket. Several of the Austrian specialists 
in prenatal testing have worked in 
other countries and learned from their 
colleagues abroad. For that reason 
developments in prenatal testing take 
place on an international scale, but 
they are situated in specific national or 
even regional contexts. This paper will 
bring together both dimensions and 
thereby exemplary show how interna-
tional developments in diagnostic 
technologies are integrated in a na-
tional medical practice. 
 
 
3 Medical background on the 
developments of testing meth-
ods 
During the last ten years, quite a 
remarkable development can be ob-
served in prenatal testing. The overall 
number of prenatal testing by means 
of amniocentesis and CVS is declining 
dramatically. In certain Austrian hospi-
tals the total number has decreased by 
one third of its peak in 1995. Geneti-
cists report that in Germany a decline 
of 50 percent can be observed4 and a 
recent studies refers to a similar 
change in the USA (c.f. Wray et al. 
2005: 353; Benn/Fang/Egan 2005: 328, 
Benn et al. 2004). In order to offer an 
explanation for the dramatic change in 
the frequency of invasive prenatal 
testing it is argued that the medical 
technologies applied play a major role. 
Decisions of pregnant women and 
                                                       
4 Based on interview data as conducted by 
the author. 
Figure 1 - Total number of invasive prenatal tests 
 
 
Total: total number of all women who have undergone invasive prenatal tests (accord-
ing to various indications). 
Maternal age: tested women of advanced age 
Rest together: tested women of all other indications 
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related counselling processes cannot 
be understood appropriately if tech-
nologies and the medical data they 
produce are seen as neutral or even 
negligible as an influence. 
Taking a closer look on the diagram 
above (figure 1)5, it becomes obvious 
that the dynamic of the total number 
of invasive prenatal testing is deter-
mined chiefly by just one factor: ma-
ternal age. Any test has a justification 
why it is undertaken and if the justifi-
cation is "only" that a particular 
woman wants to have it. But most of 
the time there is a medical justifica-
tion, i.e. a higher risk of foetal anoma-
lies compared with that on average. If 
this is the case and there actually is 
such a higher risk, in medical terms 
this is called an "indication". For 
example a prenatal test could be 
indicated because a woman has previ-
ously given birth to a disabled child. 
Yet, in most cases the indication for a 
subsequent prenatal test is maternal 
                                                       
5 The figures refer to empirical data from a 
specific clinic, which remains anonymous 
here. 
age. Women of 35 years and older 
show a higher risk of chromosome 
aberrations* (trisomies* or transloca-
tions*). As one can see from the dia-
gram above (figure 1) up to three 
quarters of all invasive prenatal tests 
have been undertaken for that very 
reason (between 1978 and 2003 the 
ratio did not drop below 68% and 
reached its peak in 2001 at 77.6% in 
the presented case). Advanced mater-
nal age is regarded as an indicator 
because of the correlation as described 
here: "Generally the probability of a 
birth of a child with Down's syndrome 
(and many other chromosome anoma-
lies) increases with the age of the 
mother. The so-called age indication 
following from the fact that this is the 
most frequent reason for a prenatal 
chromosome analysis" (Sancken et al. 
2003, my translation). A diagram 
(figure 2) shows the correlation be-
tween birth giving age of the mother 
and a higher rate of chromosome 
aberration; trisomy 21 in this case. 
Generally it is true that women of 
advanced maternal age do have a 
higher risk. But for some reason this 
Figure 2 - Maternal age and trisomy 21 
Source: Snijders et al. (1999:169)
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correlation no longer plays such a 
significant role in the management of 
antenatal care. Advanced maternal age 
is not indicating an invasive prenatal 
test to the extent that it did only a few 
years ago. This becomes clear when 
considering the dramatic decline in the 
number of examinations indicated by 
advanced maternal age. At this point 
the question arises: why is that the 
case? 
The first point to mention is that, if age 
is the chief indicator for a higher risk, 
many pregnant women will be tested. 
In Austria the proportion of women 
who are of advanced age (35 years and 
older) and give birth to a child is 15% 
(Statistik Austria 2004: 68).6 This 
equates to 11,856 women in the whole 
country in 2002. However, even if, 
theoretically, all pregnant women of 
advanced age would be tested, the 
                                                       
6 Only in 1981 the proportion of women 
giving birth to a child at the age of 35 or 
older was 6,4%; a total of 6.016 women 
(Statistik Austria 2004: 68). According to a 
recent publication in Germany the propor-
tion of pregnant women of advanced 
maternal age is about 13%" (c.f. Sancken et 
al. 2003). 
majority of trisomy 21 pregnancies will 
not be detected that way. This argu-
ment was already made at the time 
when maternal age was sharply on the 
rise. Wald et al. explained that "in 
practice fewer than 15% of affected 
pregnancies are detected because 
fewer than half of these older women 
actually have amniocentesis" (Wald et 
al. 1988: 883).7 
Equally Saller and Canick pointed out 
in the mid 1990s, when age indication 
reached its peak: "by only offering 
amniocentesis to women older than 
age 35 only approximately 20% of 
foetal Down's syndrome will be de-
tected" in practice, and furthermore 
they conclude: "This approach results 
in failure to detect the approximately 
80% of babies with Down syndrome 
born to women younger than age 35." 
(Saller/Canick 1996: 784) Meanwhile 
the proportion of women who have 
babies at a later stage of their life has 
increased. Consequently the percent-
age of possible detection* with age as 
                                                       
7 This has been claimed for the UK where 
5% of women are aged 36 or greater when 
being pregnant (Wald et al. 1988: 883).  
Figure 3 - Chromosome aberration in relation to invasive prenatal tests per-
formed 
Pathologic results with chromosome aberration in percent of all women tested with
invasive methods. 
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an indicator has increased and is 
estimated at about 30 to 40 percent if 
all women 35 and older would be 
tested (c.f. Sancken et al. 2003). De-
spite the fact that maternal age has 
increased on average the majority of 
trisomy 21 pregnancies are still con-
ceived by women younger than 35. 
Some have concluded on the basis of 
this that "with regard to the total 
population of pregnant women age 
indication is neither particularly sensi-
tive nor very specific" (Sancken et al. 
2003). In short, from a medical point 
of view maternal age is an indicator, 
but it is not a very good one. One 
could even say that it is not much 
more than a qualified guess that about 
four out of a thousand 35 year old 
pregnant women are carrying foetuses 
with Down's syndrome. 
Following the described logic a more 
accurate indicator than maternal age is 
desirable. The point now is, that 
meanwhile there are better indicators 
that help to identify for an amniocen-
tesis or CVS those women who have 
more reasons to undergo such exami-
nations than simply being of advanced 
age.  
When looking at the data one can 
observe that even though the total 
number of invasive prenatal tests has 
gone down by about 40%, the number 
of foetuses diagnosed with chromo-
some aberration is still going up.8 
Figure 39 shows how significant this 
development is by relating the number 
of test results with chromosome 
aberrations to performed examina-
tions. If this development is a result of 
the availability of better indicators, so 
what are these better indicators? The 
answer to this question is: non-
invasive prenatal testing is a better 
                                                       
8 46 chromosome aberrations out of 1067 
tested women of age indication in 2000; 76 
chromosome aberrations out 771 tested 
women of age indication of 2003. 
9 The figures refer to empirical data from a 
specific clinic, which remains anonymous 
here. 
indicator for subsequent invasive 
examinations than simply maternal 
age alone. 
Historically it was the so-called triple-
test* that first provided a better 
judgement of the likelihood that a 
foetus would show anomalies. The 
problem with this triple-test is that it 
produces a relatively high number of 
false results as Babbur et al. point out 
in a recent publication: "For the 
screened population, to achieve an 
88% detection rate using the triple test 
alone, the predicted FPR [false-positive 
rate*] would be 20%. Conversely, for 
an FPR of 4,8% using the triple test 
alone, the detection rate would be only 
60%" (Babbur et al. 2005: 465). For 
that reason, the triple-test was contro-
versial among physicians, and some 
Austrian hospitals decided not to use it 
any longer. 
Also in the literature the triple-test is 
contested: "The original age indication 
limiting prenatal diagnosis to women 
over 35 has now largely disappeared in 
practice, so that every pregnant 
woman is notified of the possibility of 
PD [prenatal diagnosis] by her gynae-
cologist. The expansion of the use of 
PD has been driven by the so-called 
'triple test', which makes it possible to 
identify an increased risk of chromo-
somal anomalies in a foetus from an 
examination of the mother's blood. 
Although this test is under severe 
criticism from human geneticists for its 
lack of validation and frequent false 
positive (and negative) results, it is 
offered by many gynaecologists as a 
'safety first' test, which is often fol-
lowed by a (frequently unnecessary) 
amniocentesis" (Hennen et al. 2000: 
9).10 
At first maternal serum* screening was 
offered as an alternative option for 
those women who did not accept the 
                                                       
10 Translated by the authors in an English 
summary of their working report 
(www.tab.fzk.de/en/projekt/zusammenfas-
sung/ab66.htm; last access 07. Mar. 2006). 
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risk of amniocentesis or CVS. Yet, once 
these tests became available, they also 
gained the function of providing a 
more profound risk assessment for 
those women who wanted to have 
additional information prior to making 
a decision about having amniocentesis 
(c.f. Newberger 2000). Indeed maternal 
serum screening is still advocated as a 
useful means to reduce the number of 
amniocenteses (c.f. Rosen et al. 2002). 
Meanwhile, ultrasound has also be-
come more important, largely due to 
recent improvements. Initially, ultra-
sound was not precise enough to 
detect Down's syndrome foetuses (or 
other chromosome aberrations), but 
this has changed with technological 
advancements in the picture quality. At 
first, ultrasound was used at a later 
stage of the pregnancy and it was used 
for Down's screening only in cases 
where an indication was already given. 
Second-trimester* ultrasound assess-
ment (15-23 weeks) was offered to 
women with increased risk "for trisomy 
21 based on advanced maternal age or 
abnormal maternal serum biochemical 
marker screening, who either had 
declined amniocentesis or chose to 
have a sonogram before deciding 
whether to undergo amniocentesis" 
(Vintzileos et al. 1996: 949). In this 
case ultrasound serves as a second 
step to provide further evidence in an 
already ongoing risk assessment.  
But, there is a tendency to turn this 
upside down. Ultrasound increasingly 
becomes the first step. "Increased fetal 
nuchal translucency is associated with 
chromosomal abnormalities, many 
fetal defects and genetic syndromes" 
(Souka et al. 2001: 9). Ultrasound 
measurement of nuchal translucency* 
is therefore used as a first-trimester 
screening test. Nuchal translucency 
first-trimester screening has a detec-
tion rate of about 76,8% at a false-
positive rate of 4,2% (c.f. Krampl 2005: 
86). In other words, three quarters of 
all foetuses with trisomy 21 can be 
identified that way, but this rate can be 
increased if other biochemical tests are 
performed additionally (called the 
combined test*). Together with an 
analysis of maternal serum (ß-HCG11, 
PAPP A12) the detection is as high as 
87% with a false-positive rate of 5% 
(c.f. Krampl 2005: 86). This can be 
further increased if an ultrasound of 
the nose bone is also performed.13 
Geneticists claim that it can be as high 
as 95 to 97%.14 
Not only are there several alternatives 
in prenatal testing, they are also linked 
together: "Women who are screen-
positive in the first trimester can elect 
to receive cytogenetic testing of a 
chorionic villius biopsy. The first 
trimester test could also, theoretically, 
be combined with the second trimester 
maternal serum screening test (inte-
grated screening) to obtain even 
higher levels of efficacy" (Benn 2002: 
1). 
The point now is that pregnant women 
older than 35 do not need to decide 
whether or not to undergo an amnio-
centesis or CVS just on the basis of an 
anonymous statistical probability. Now 
they can take this decision on the 
basis of personal risk "evidence" pro-
vided by non-invasive testing. And if 
this is the case – that such a non-
invasive screening produces a higher 
risk factor – results of the screening 
would justify a subsequent amniocen-
tesis or CVS. 
Currently there is a trend in invasive 
prenatal testing that such tests are 
performed less often just because of a 
                                                       
11 Human Chorion Gonadotrophin 
12 Pregnancy Associated Plasmaprotein-A 
13 In case the result of an ultrasound 
examination between 11 and 14 weeks is 
the absence of the nasal bone (broad nosal 
bridge syndrome) this is understood to be 
an indicator for foetal abnormalities. 
"Research results indicate that including 
this marker along with the mother's age, 
baby's age, nuchal fold measurement, and 
blood tests can bring the accuracy of the 
risk assessment up to 97 percent." (Baby-
Center 1997-2004b) 
14 According to interview data conducted by 
the author. 
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higher risk due to maternal age (an 
indirect guess based on statistics), but 
increasingly because of a higher risk 
due to risk "evidence" (based on previ-
ous tests). And this is a significant 
difference. Such "evidence" is still no 
proof, but from a medical point of view 
it is a much better risk assessment 
than a "guess" based on maternal age 
alone. The decline of invasive prenatal 
testing indicated by maternal age 
(figure 1) shows how outdated the 
latter has become as an indicator for 
invasive prenatal testing. The observed 
tendency can be related to the in-
creased application of non-invasive 
screening tests. Taken together a shift 
can be observed. This includes a shift 
from maternal age indication to testing 
as a result of prior screening, but a 
series of other changes are evident, 
too. 
1. Increasingly there has already 
been some sort of examination – 
on the basis of which a higher risk 
is determined – before invasive 
testing is carried out. Maternal 
age, on the other hand, is a pre-
sumption without more specific 
empirical evidence for the specific 
case. Now that maternal age has 
lost its importance as an indica-
tion for invasive prenatal testing, 
other indicators have become 
more important. 
2. These other indicators which have 
become more important are pro-
duced by means of non-invasive 
screening methods, mostly ultra-
sonic tests (and the combined ma-
ternal blood test) as already men-
tioned. And because non-invasive 
tests have become more important 
and more reliable, the total num-
ber of amniocentesis and CVS has 
gone down dramatically. 
"For many years, research on ma-
ternal blood tests has been per-
formed. A tendency towards pre-
selection on the basis of non-
invasive methods can be noted. 
This way, an earlier start, higher 
effectiveness and higher accep-
tance can be achieved as well as a 
distribution of prenatal testing 
across all stages of age" (Ar-
beitsstelle Pränataldiagnostik/Re-
produktionsmedizin 2004). 
3. As mentioned in the previous 
quote, the current shift in prenatal 
testing represents also a shift to-
wards testing at a much earlier 
stage, from second to first trimes-
ter of the pregnancy. Time is in 
fact a major factor in prenatal test-
ing and many have argued (c.f. 
Katz-Rothman 1989) that the ear-
lier the testing the better it will be. 
Not only does the time a women 
has to wait for the result matter 
(which is a major disadvantage of 
amniocentesis), but also the ad-
vancement in the pregnancy 
makes a difference. If an abortion 
is to be considered, this is easier 
to cope with before the 24 week of 
the pregnancy when a curettage* 
can still be performed. 
4. The tendency is noted that non-
invasive techniques lead to an ex-
pansion in prenatal testing. A 
growth in participation can be 
concluded since the number of in-
vasive tests has gone down but the 
number of pathologic results has 
increased significantly at the same 
time (see figure 3.). Most likely this 
is explained by more young 
women deciding in favour of a 
non-invasive screening. 
5. Another reason for the expansion 
of prenatal testing can also be re-
lated to the fact that invasive tests 
require a specialized laboratory 
that is able to carry out the analy-
sis. In Austria there are only a few 
of such laboratories.15 Non-
invasive techniques, however, al-
ready have a much higher dis-
                                                       
15 In fact the common practice in invasive 
testing is that the sample was taken not 
only in clinics which had a cytogenetic 
laboratory. Those who did not have a 
laboratory on their own would send it to 
one of these institutions for the analysis. 
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semination and can be performed 
in a number of clinics. 
6. Non-invasive screening tests also 
lead to "inescapable decisions". 
Generally, all couples are at risk of 
conceiving a child with chromo-
some aberrations or other anoma-
lies, but a statistical probability 
does not tell who will and who will 
not. Advanced maternal age is a 
hint that the probability increases 
with age, but it does not tell who 
will actually give birth to a child 
with chromosomal anomalies. 
Only an invasive test can answer 
this question. But now non-
invasive screenings provide an in-
dividual risk figure. By these 
means, decisions are increasingly 
taken on the basis of individually 
determined risk and not any 
longer on an anonymous statisti-
cal correlation, which could dis-
tinguish a certain age group at 
best. In this sense, one could say 
that invasive tests have become 
more medicalized, because deci-
sions no longer start from zero. 
7. Finally a last shift can be noted. 
The decision-making process is di-
vided into a number of small deci-
sions. There is no such thing as 
"one" decision, where everything is 
decided at once. In other words, 
decisions are by no means a-
priori, i.e. without pre-conditions. 
On the contrary, decisions are 
taken step by step with one lead-
ing to another: first the individual 
risk is determined, then a definite 
diagnosis is produced and only 
then does the question arise about 
whether or not to abort the preg-
nancy. 
As the presented data show the shift 
described has only come about only 
recently. In the second half of the 
1990s a stagnation of performed 
invasive prenatal tests can be noted. 
However, that this development would 
turn into a decline became clear only 
after 2001 when tests induced by age 
indication significantly dropped. 
Obviously the technologies which have 
lead to the mentioned changes in 
prenatal medicine have been devel-
oped several years earlier. Nuchal 
translucency measurement was devel-
oped in the 1990s and combined with 
maternal serum markers thereafter (c.f. 
Nicolaides et al. 1992; Brizot et al. 
1994). Until the innovation could 
exercise its full impact in Austria, 
physicians had to be trained (in Lon-
don at King's College), but also the 
knowledge about the existence of the 
new method and who is able to per-
form it had to be communicated. 
Furthermore it takes some time to 
change the regime of antenatal care in 
which pregnant women are informed 
about diagnostic possibilities and 
referred to respective specialists. 
However, meanwhile the shift has 
become evident. One of our interview-
ees explained that they have a partici-
pation rate of 99% of all women who 
give birth in their hospital. A physician 
from a centre in another province of 
the country said: Yes, we offer non-
invasive screening to all pregnant 
women. They only come to me after 
the screen. And from a third centre for 
prenatal testing we know that the 
number of chromosome aberrations 
diagnosed (with invasive methods) has 
doubled since 2000. This means that 
also the number of tested women has 
at least doubled taking into account 
that more and more young women are 
screened with nuchal translucensy 
measurement. Although comprehen-
sive data of the entire country on the 
participation of pregnant women in 
antenatal screening programmes are 
not available there is clear evidence for 
a substantial diffusion of non-invasive 
screening methods. 
4 Discussion 
It is argued that the observed shift in 
prenatal testing leads to an individu-
alization process. From a medical 
point of view it might be desirable to 
have a more accurate risk assessment, 
which allows for a better management 
of invasive prenatal testing (decisions 
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seem to be evidence based and there-
fore more rational). But on the other 
hand the determination of an individ-
ual risk can also be seen from a socio-
logical point of view. 
The notion individualization was 
prominently introduced by Ulrich Beck 
in his book "Die Risikogesellschaft" 
(Beck 1986) and Elisabeth Beck-
Gernsheim (1990) has discussed indi-
vidualization in the context of repro-
duction. Already when the concept was 
introduced it was argued that indi-
vidualization does not only lead to an 
increased freedom of choice, but that it 
would also lead to a pressure to take 
decisions. Furthermore Beck argued 
that individualization is paradoxical 
and includes what he has called "con-
trol" or "reintegration dimension" 
(1992: 128). From this point of view 
prenatal testing means the integration 
of pregnant women into a control 
regime. Indeed, with the expansion of 
ultrasound screening more and more 
pregnant women are integrated into a 
medical network, which determines 
their individual risk for foetal anoma-
lies. In his Book "Discipline and Pun-
ish" (1975) the French philosopher 
Michel Foucault has defined individu-
alization as the identifiability of the 
individual. Following this understand-
ing of individualization it can be ar-
gued that the prenatal regime aims to 
differentiate pregnant women and this 
differentiation is predominantly carried 
out in terms of risk. The place they are 
allocated to is derived from a sophisti-
cated risk-assessment. 
Nevertheless, this does certainly not 
mean that pregnant women are not 
free to decide. It is essential for prena-
tal testing that it is the women con-
cerned who decide about their own 
pregnancies. This results in a funda-
mental paradox: There are more and 
more possible decisions, but these 
possibilities are produced in a system-
atic way. Thomas Lemke has argued 
that decisions become increasingly 
choices between options, but the 
options are pre-given beforehand and 
structured by pre-decisions (c.f. Lemke 
2000: 243). It is increasingly impossi-
ble not to choose because it is harder 
and harder to escape the risk assess-
ment by means of ultrasound screen-
ing. Choices promise freedom, but the 
confrontation with one's individual 
risk demands a decision which takes 
the screening results into account. 
Whether a chromosome anomaly is 
actually given or not can only be 
clarified through an invasive diagnos-
tic step (cytogenetic methods are not 
based on statistical methods, but they 
provide definite results at a very low 
rate of false results). However, such 
invasive tests are bound to a risk of 
miscarriage (c.f. Evans/Wapner 2005). 
For this reason many women want to 
avoid an invasive examination. But as 
it has been argued in this paper such 
decisions whether or not to undergo 
an amniocentesis or CVS are increas-
ingly bound to an upstream risk as-
sessment. Hence these decisions are 
not taken without conditions, they are 
taken under consideration of medically 
generated data. 
The point now is that these risk-data 
are produced in a framework which 
substantially differs from invasive 
testing. Our interviews suggest that 
increasingly genetic counselling is only 
performed in cases of positive screen-
ing results (prior to invasive testing). 
Decision autonomy is still the central 
ethical orientation in prenatal testing, 
but the consent procedure prior to 
non-invasive screening is largely 
formalized and often women don't 
realize the significance of the examina-
tion. Women are still asked to decide 
and they are explained that it is their 
own personal decision, but the mo-
ment of such a deliberate decision 
comes only after positive screening 
results. It is questionable if such 
decisions can be accounted "autono-
mous" if they are taken against the 
backdrop of a risk-assessment pro-
duced by medical examinations. 
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Apparently the described technological 
transformation in prenatal testing goes 
along with significant changes in the 
practice of its application. However, 
the assumption that "technical change 
causes social change" is usually la-
belled as technological determinism 
(MacKenzie/Wajcman 1985: 5). Günter 
Ropohl talks about "consequential 
technological determinism" (1991: 
193). The criticism is, that technology 
is nothing original, but technology 
itself is socially created. 
Nevertheless, one may ask, why it is 
possible to carry out non-invasive 
testing in a different organizational 
framework than invasive testing: Why 
is it possible for gynaecologists to 
perform nuchal translucency meas-
urement without thorough conversa-
tion about the significance of the 
examination, whereas geneticists still 
insist on profound genetic counselling 
prior to amniocentesis? Both test 
methods are predictive malformation 
diagnostics. Thus the differences in the 
practice of their application require an 
explanation. 
The risk of miscarriage caused by the 
examination is a substantial difference 
between invasive and non-invasive 
testing that can be related to the 
technology. Bettelheim et al. specify 
the risk of miscarriage (including 
intrauterine foetal death) to be 0.44 for 
Amniocentesis and 0.99% for CVS 
(2002: 119). Not least for liability 
reasons an essential task of the coun-
selling interview is to inform the 
pregnant women about the risks and 
limitations of the examinations them-
selves. But if the risk that the per-
formed examination may cause a 
miscarriage can be precluded there is 
no need to seek for "informed consent" 
for that reason. 
There are certainly more reasons for 
counselling prior to prenatal testing. 
Doubtlessly the ethical model of deci-
sion autonomy needs to be understood 
in its historical context, namely as a 
possibility to overcome classical 
eugenics and the catastrophe of Na-
zism. Nevertheless, against the back-
drop of the changes in the current 
practice of prenatal testing, it is also 
important not to disregard the efficacy 
of the technology applied. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to highlight 
the significance of the emergence of 
new prenatal screening technologies 
and to show their impact on medical 
practices. The role these screening 
technologies play, becomes evident 
when relating their development and 
dissemination to the frequency of the 
total number of invasive prenatal tests. 
By emphasising the role of technology 
the question arises: how autonomous 
can a decision be? To what extent can 
a decision about whether or not to 
have amniocentesis (or CVS) be re-
garded as autonomous if it is taken on 
the basis of previous risk assessments 
determined by screening. The concept 
of autonomy is difficult to uphold if 
diagnostic technologies apparently 
have such a strong impact. 
The decision about whether or not to 
undergo invasive tests increasingly 
depends on medical evidence. Such 
medical evidence is produced from the 
first moment a woman learns about 
her pregnancy. It is largely through 
improvements in ultrasound screening 
and other non-invasive tests that 
maternal age loses its importance as 
the chief indicator for an invasive test. 
The corresponding decline of amnio-
centeses or CVS shows that non-
invasive screening methods serve as a 
means of risk assessment further 
upstream. But it is not only pregnant 
women of advanced age who can now 
decide on the basis of a previous risk 
assessment. More and more pregnant 
women undergo such a "pre-test" in 
screening programmes. It has been 
argued that the new diagnostic tech-
nologies contribute to an expansion of 
prenatal testing even though invasive 
tests are performed less frequent. This 
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way the character of prenatal testing 
becomes quite different; it can be 
argued that ultrasound changes the 
function of invasive tests. Amniocente-
ses and CVS are increasingly carried 
out to confirm a qualified suspicion 
produced by a risk assessment up-
stream. 
In the introductory section of this 
paper it was stated that the highest 
priority is given to the autonomy of the 
patient, and that the goal of counsel-
ling is to ensure this for individual 
decision made by pregnant women. 
Having argued that decisions are 
increasingly "pre-informed" through 
upstream risk assessments on the 
basis of non-invasive screening, the 
question arises as to how patient 
autonomy and individual decisions go 
together with current developments in 
prenatal testing. Is the philosophical 
concept of an autonomous subject still 
appropriate for the problem at stake, 
and if not, are there alternatives? What 
does all of this mean for the concept of 
informed consent? And last but not 
least, what does the current develop-
ment mean for counselling practices? 
As a matter of fact there is not much 
counselling involved prior to ultra-
sound or maternal serum screening. In 
many European countries prenatal 
screening is offered routinely,16 but 
increasingly genetic counselling is only 
performed in cases of positive screen-
ing results (prior to invasive tests). The 
practice of prenatal testing has 
changed considerably since such new 
screening methods as described above 
are available. Despite its significance 
this transformation has not received 
much public recognition in Austria to 
this point. Public discourses have 
rather focused on other aspects of 
genetic or reproductive technologies 
such as stem cell research, human 
cloning or pre-implantation diagnosis. 
Taking this into account it is even 
more important to analyse how tech-
                                                       
16 A remarkable exception to this rule are 
the Netherlands. 
nological innovations transform medi-
cal practices without a re-articulation 
on a discursive level as it was tried to 
show in this paper for the case of 
prenatal testing. 
 
6 Glossary 
Aberration (chromosomal): the medical 
term for an abnormal set of 
chromosomes. Humans have 46 
chromosomes in each cell. Too many or 
to few chromosomes in the cells are 
associated with particular disabilities 
and diseases. This is also the case if the 
chromosomes are damaged, a piece is 
missing or to much in the set of 
chromosomes. See also chromosome, 
translocation, and trisomy. 
Amniocentesis: a diagnostic test, usually 
carried out between 14 - 17 weeks of 
pregnancy, in which a needle is 
inserted through the abdomen to 
remove a sample of amniotic fluid 
containing cells from the developing 
baby for testing. Either the 
chromosomes of the cells are examined 
for prenatal diagnosis of genetic 
abnormality or DNA is prepared for 
analysis. Ultrasound is used to guide 
the needle. The procedure carries a risk 
of miscarriage of about 0.5%. 
Chorionic villus sampling (CVS): a 
diagnostic test normally performed 
between 9 - 11 weeks of pregnancy. A 
needle is inserted through the mother's 
abdomen or cervix and is used to 
remove a small amount of placental 
tissue (afterbirth). Foetal chromosomes 
or DNA can then be examined similar to 
amniocentesis. The procedure carries a 
risk of miscarriage of about 1%. 
Chromosome: a piece of densely packed 
DNA containing hereditary information 
of the organism. See also aberration, 
translocation, and trisomy. 
Combinet test: a non-invasive screening 
method, which combines nuchal 
translucency measurement and 
maternal serum test. In such a way the 
predictability of chromosomal 
anomalies can be increased up to 87%. 
If an ultrasound of the nose bone is 
also performed, the predictability can 
be further increased to 95-97%. 
Curettage: a surgical abortion refers to the 
procedure performed by a doctor to 
remove the pregnancy from the uterus. 
In early pregnancy the surgical abortion 
is called a vacuum aspiration or a 
suction curettage.   
Cytogenetics (cytogenetic testing): the 
study of the structure, function, and 
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abnormalities of human chromosomes 
and chromosomal anomalies. For 
prenatal testing a sample of foetal cells 
is required, gained either by 
amniocentesis or chorionic villus 
sampling (CVS). 
Detection (rate): it is not possible to 
identify all chromosome anomalies 
with non-invasive screening methods. 
The detection rate indicates the ratio of 
the cases that are identified by means 
of a particular test in relation to all 
cases that are actually given. 
False negative: test results which suggest 
that a foetus does not have a condition 
which it later turns out to have. 
False positive: test results which suggest 
that a foetus has a condition which it 
later turns out not to have. 
Genetic counselling: A process by which 
information is imparted to those 
affected by or at risk of a genetic 
disorder. It includes information on the 
nature of the disorder, the size and 
extent of genetic risks, the options, 
including genetic testing, that may help 
clarify the risks, and the available 
preventative, supportive and 
therapeutic measures. In the context of 
genetic testing it may include 
responding to the concerns of 
individuals referred and their families, 
discussing the consequences of a test, 
and help choose the optimal decision 
for themselves, but not determining a 
particular course of action. 
Indication: the reason or justification for 
carrying out a diagnostic or therapeutic 
measure. 
Informed consent: permission given by an 
individual to proceed with a specific 
test or procedure, with an 
understanding of the risks, benefits, 
limitations, and potential implications 
of the procedure itself and its results. 
Invasive methods: amniocentesis, 
chorionic villus sampling (CVS) or other 
procedures to take a sample of foetal 
cells. Such invasive methods of sample 
taking are necessary for diagnostic 
testing, i.e. the analysis of the 
chromosomes or sequences of the DNA. 
Maternal serum: refers to maternal blood 
in the context of prenatal testing. 
"Maternal Serum (Screening) Tests" are 
blood tests performed to determine the 
risk of foetal anomalies (such as neural 
tube defects and chromosomal 
anomalies). The calculation is based on 
the levels of alpha-fetoprotein, estriol, 
and human chorionic gonadotropin in 
the mother's blood during pregnancy. 
These indicators can be measured 
alone (triple test) or together with a 
nuchal translucency measurement 
(combined test). 
Neural tube: a structure in early foetal life 
that develops into the brain, spinal 
cord, spinal nerves and spine. Defects 
of the neural tube are severe conditions 
and sometimes lethal. To the present 
knowledge, they are not genetic, 
although it is assumed that they might 
be. 
Non-invasive methods: ultrasound 
examinations or maternal serum tests 
where no foetal cells are taken. Such 
non-invasive methods allow for 
probabilistic tests in order to determine 
the risk of foetal anomalies (such as 
neural tube defects and chromosomal 
anomalies). This form of prenatal 
testing is also referred to as screening. 
See also maternal serum and nuchal 
translucency measurement. 
Nuchal translucency (measurement): the 
nuchal translucency test is used to 
determine if a woman is at high risk of 
having a baby with a chromosomal 
anomaly.  
Translocation: an anomaly, which has 
moved one piece of a chromosome to a 
different position. Translocations can 
be balanced (the set of chromosomes is 
complete, but does not have the proper 
form) or unbalanced (a piece of a 
chromosome is missing or too much in 
the set of chromosomes). 
Trimester (first, second or third): any of the 
three 3-month periods into which 
pregnancy is divided. 
Triple test: a maternal serum test used to 
determine the risk of foetal anomalies 
(such as neural tube defects and 
chromosomal anomalies). The 
calculation is based on the levels of 
alpha-fetoprotein, estriol, and human 
chorionic gonadotropin in the mother's 
blood during pregnancy. Also called 
"Multiple Marker Test".  
Trisomy: three copies of a single 
chromosome in the cells. The most 
common form is trisomy 21, the so 
called Down's syndrome. 
 
 
Sources used for the glossary 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/ghr/glossary 
www.antenataltesting.info/glossary.html 
www.firstbabymall.com/expecting/pregnan
cy/testing2.htm 
www.medgen.ubc.ca/wrobinson/mosaic/glo
ssary.htm 
www.nature.ca/genome/02/022_mno_e.cfm 
www.paternityangel.com/general_info_zon
e/Glossary.htm 
www.tellparliament.net/scitech/glossary 
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www.todaysplanet.com/pg/beta/medical/glo
ssary.htm 
www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucbhjow/b241/glossary.ht
ml 
www.webmd.com/content/article/4/1680_5
1798 
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Abstract 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a rapidly evolving technology. While 
industrialists hope that the use of RFID will bring about great benefits, civil rights 
activists warn against the dangers. Since RFID pervades everyday life more and 
more, this paper deals with its potential impact on individuals. Currently private 
persons are least included in the public debate, although perhaps they will be 
affected the most by potential negative effects. 
Critics are especially concerned about the potential violation of privacy. Due to its 
informational infrastructure RFID could be used for surveillance purposes. Many 
people therefore fear a surveillance state. Looking at the use of RFID on the prod-
uct level, completely dynamic pricing and business models could be developed. If 
everyday objects record and send context sensitive information via embedded RFID 
tags, this might strongly influence our perception of these objects and our emo-
tional attitude towards them. This relationship between man and RFID containing 
smart objects is expected to differ from the relationship between man and ma-
chines as well as man and computers, as a new function as well as a new signifi-
cance are added to already well-known objects. 
Last but not least, this paper also points out RFID's potential impact on health and 
environment, which has barely been discussed in public so far. 
The analysis shows that, apart from certain opportunities, considerable risks have 
to be dealt with. However, panic, as suggested by some critics, seems unreason-
able as the development is still wide open. This should rather be considered a great 
chance: it offers the possibility to play an active role in the shaping of RFID within 
a legal democratic process. In this process all members of society are likewise 
responsible for future developments. 
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1 Introduction 
Today Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) is a rapidly evolving technology 
and at the same time it is strongly 
disputed among experts. Some com-
panies already use RFID while others 
plan its implementation in the near 
future (SOREON 2004). Enormous 
progress is predicted for the miniaturi-
sation of chips, by lower costs, an 
increase of storage capacity and devel-
opments in materials sciences (Mat-
tern 2003: 11). Thus, numerous inno-
vative applications of RFID will be-
come possible. Even today industry is 
highly committed to this technology, 
because it reckons with more efficient 
processing conditions in the long run.1 
Yet civil rights activists draw the atten-
tion to the risks of RFID concerning 
data protection and privacy.2 Some 
even draw the attention to a possible 
fall of the democratic constitutional 
state regarding RFID (Brust 2004). 
Specifically alarming is the fact that 
the general public – especially in 
Germany – hardly knows anything 
about RFID (Capgemini 2005), while it 
pervades everyday life, continually and 
unnoticed by many people. 
This paper wants to present a survey of 
some potential effects of RFID on 
everyday life with a special focus on 
questions and consequences from the 
individual's point of view. Further-
more, the different positions in the 
debate will be discussed as well as the 
question of accountability concerning 
the development of this technology. 
 
                                                       
1 One of the most important publications in 
this field is the RFID-Journal. It presents a 
survey of the latest technological develop-
ments and pilot projects, 
www.rfidjournal.com [as at 28.12.2005]. 
2 Among the main critics are, for example, 
Katherine Albrecht, chairperson of the 
Organisation CASPIAN (USA), 
www.spychips.org [as at 28.12.2005], Rena 
Tangens and padeluun, chairperson of 
FoeBud e.V. (Germany), www.foebud.org/ 
rfid [as at 28.12.2005]. 
2 RFID: technological basis and 
examples of usage 
2.1 Technological basis 
RFID technology is an automated 
identification technology. By means of 
RFID objects, animals or persons can 
be clearly identified over a certain 
distance. RFID systems always consist 
of two components: a transponder and 
a reader. The reader consists of a 
reading and possibly a writing unit3 
and an antenna. It transmits energy to 
the transponder, scans its data and 
possibly makes the transponder store 
additional data. A transponder only 
sends data if it is near a corresponding 
reader ("on call"). The transponder, 
also called 'tag', is the actual data 
carrier, consisting of an antenna and a 
chip. On this chip a unique identifica-
tion number is stored. Between 16 and 
64 kb of additional data can be stored, 
depending on the kind of transponder 
(Finkenzeller 2002: 8). 
RFID tags exist in different sizes and 
shapes: as self-adhesive labels (so-
called smart labels), as glass cylinder 
transponders, as plastic transponders, 
as watches, keychain pendants, or as 
plastic cards (so-called smart cards). 
There are numerous other types which 
can be adjusted according to usage 
(Finkenzeller 2002: 14-22). The for-
gery-proof nature of RFID tags is 
commonly considered as very high 
(Finkenzeller 2002: 8; Oertel et al. 
2004: 90). RFID systems differ on 
frequency bands, transmission ranges, 
storing technologies, security systems4 
and means of power supply. All these 
factors together constitute the quali-
ties of the system. Therefore one 
cannot speak of the RFID system. 
Transmission ranges often appear to 
                                                       
3 Not every RFID system contains a writing 
unit, because not all kinds of transponders 
are rewritable and allow the storage of 
additional data on top of an unique identi-
fication number. 
4 There are different procedures for authen-
tification and codification available. 
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be unclear. In exceptional cases a 
transmission range of up to one kilo-
metre can be reached. However, the 
systems that are used in Europe only 
reach a few centimetres – because of 
legal restrictions on the one hand and 
the development status on the other 
hand – smart labels for instance which 
are applied to the product level, or 1.2 
to 4 metres for applications in the 
logistics branch (RF-ID 2004; IDTe-
chEx 2004; Oertel et al. 2004: 29).5 
RFID systems still have technical 
deficiencies. Among them are 
• the high costs, 
• the low degree of standardisation 
concerning the compatibility of 
products from different manufac-
turers or of different frequency 
ranges,6 
• gaps in the security systems used,7 
• performance problems in the vicin-
ity of metal and certain liquids 
                                                       
5 The technical information of this chapter 
largely follows Klaus Finkenzeller`s "RFID-
Handbuch" (2002), which I would like to 
recommend for further technical details. 
6 The use of multiple frequency readers 
could be a big step forward. One of the first 
of its kind was presented at the end of 
2005, cf.                                                        
http://ubiks.net/local/blog/jmt/archives3/00
4561.html [as at 28.12.2005] 
7 These are discussed in detail in the essay 
on "Risiken und Chancen des Einsatzes von 
RFID-Systemen", published by the Bundes-
amt für Sicherheit in der Informationstech-
nik (Oertel et al. 2004: 41-65). 
• as well as a lack of globally stan-
dardised regulations for radio fre-
quencies. 
All these problems have hindered 
global usage so far (Oertel et al. 2004: 
101-111). 
However, experts believe that the 
present technical problems will be 
largely overcome by 2010 (Oertel et al. 
2004: 106) and they expect a further 
exponential increase in performance, 
according to Moore's law (Moore 
1965).8 For the European market a 
strong growth of the RFID sector has 
been predicted for the following years 
(SOREON 2004; Oertel et al. 2004: 104-
111). Germany is even expected to 
become market leader by the year 
2008 (SOREON 2004). 
2.2 Examples of usage 
In the following paragraph a few 
examples of today's usage will be 
presented to show how RFID works 
and can be used, also to start reflec-
tions on potential future usage. They 
are just examples, because the tech-
                                                       
8 In summary Moore`s law from 1965 says 
that a computer`s CPU capacity will 
roughly double every 18 months. So far 
this prediction has also been confirmed in 
the field of storage capacity and communi-
cation range. Simultaneously prices for 
microelectronic components will fall 
radically while the CPU capacity remains 
the same. These facts facilitate a wide-
spread use of a technology. 
Chart 1- Basic components of an RFID system 
(based on: Finkenzeller 2002: 7) 
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nology is rapidly evolving at present; 
consequently the number of pilot 
projects and new applications is con-
stantly increasing. 
Identification of animals, objects and 
people 
The identification of animals belongs 
to one of the traditional applications of 
RFID. Especially cattle, sheep and 
goats are tagged with electronic ear 
chips or implanted transponders. If an 
animal passes a reader, it can be 
clearly identified and additional data 
on origin, diseases, sex and previous 
whereabouts can be read. According to 
a regulation by the EU all goat and 
sheep populations from a certain size 
are to be electronically tagged and all 
the data is to be stored in a central 
database by 2008 (Press releases 
2003). 
Similarly RFID is already being used 
for the identification of containers in 
transportation, of garbage containers 
and for the unique identification of 
products (Oertel et al. 2004: 67). 
Gradually, it is also used to identify 
people. In Japan RFID is used for the 
surveillance of school children, for 
example (Heise 2004). In a pilot project 
of the New York Jacobi Medical Center 
patients are kept under surveillance 
with an RFID wrist band. This applica-
tion also enables hospital staff to 
access medical records directly on the 
patient (Fiutak 2004). 
Protection against counterfeiting of 
documents 
Since the end of 2005 Germany just 
like other countries has started intro-
ducing passports containing biometric 
data such as fingerprints. They are 
encoded in an RFID tag and when 
passports are controlled they can be 
scanned and compared with the fea-
tures of the passport holder. This is 
supposed to increase the forgery-proof 
nature of the document (Die Welt 
2004). The implementation of RFID in 
banknotes is also being discussed 
(Hascher 2003; Krempl 2004). 
Protection against theft 
Retail has already been using 1-bit 
transponders for the last 40 years. 
Transponders are attached to products 
and readers are installed in security 
gates near the exit. When a product is 
bought, the transponder is removed or 
re-set to "0".9 The security gates can be 
passed with paid-for products, but a 
stolen article sets off an alarm. Librar-
ies or electronic immobilisers make 
use of RFID in a similar way (Oertel et 
al. 2004: 81-82). 
Access control 
RFID has already been firmly estab-
lished in the field of access control. 
Many companies use transponders in 
the form of cards or keychain pendants 
as electronic identification to control 
building access and record the work-
ing hours. In many holiday regions 
transponders replace hotel keys, ski 
passes or local credit cards. They also 
play a growing part in the sale of 
tickets for public transport or cultural 
events (Oertel et al. 2004: 76-80). Since 
the beginning of 2004 the Baja Beach 
Club in Barcelona, Spain, has offered 
guests a small, implantable glass 
cylinder chip to identify them. They in 
turn use it to pay for food and drinks 
(Gossett 2004). 
Tracking and tracing 
RFID is used more and more to track 
baggage and parcels, and for toll 
collection (Oertel et al. 2004: 76-80). 
However, from the industry's point of 
view the supply chain management is 
considered most important. The pro-
duction and distribution of goods 
requires complex partner networks. 
RFID tags on the product mean that it 
can be individually tracked in real time 
as it moves from location to location. 
The supply chain management be-
comes transparent and can be organ-
                                                       
9 Which is not to be confused with "turned 
off" as the tags technically cannot be 
turned off in a reliable and safe manner, 
yet. 
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ised more efficiently in the future due 
to increasing automation. Today 
mainly car industries use this technol-
ogy during the production process. In 
preliminary pilot projects it is also 
tested to track products until they are 
in the consumer's hands, for example 
in the Metro-Future-Store in Rhein-
berg, Germany (Oertel et al. 2004: 84-
89).10 
 
3 Potential impact of RFID on 
everyday life 
All participants of the discussion seem 
to agree that huge changes will be 
brought about by new RFID applica-
tions. However, the quality of these 
changes and their intensity are widely 
disputed. In the following chapter 
some potential effects will be de-
scribed. 
3.1 Protection of the private sphere 
Critics regard the invasion of privacy 
as one of the most crucial potential 
effects (Aspekte 2005; CASPIAN et al. 
2005; Oertel et al. 2004: 110). Discuss-
ing this issue it is necessary to under-
stand what the term private sphere 
means and why it is considered to be 
indispensable in a free democratic 
system. More over, it is equally neces-
sary to establish criteria for the protec-
tion of privacy. 
Description and value of the private 
sphere 
The discussion about the effects of 
RFID applications is based on Beate 
Rössler's definition of privacy (2001; 
2003). The term informational privacy 
refers to all data about a person, in 
general everything other people know 
about a person (Rössler 2003: 17). 
Informational privacy especially in-
cludes individual-related data. 
                                                       
10 More information on this project can be 
found online at www.future-store.org.[as at 
06.11.2005] 
In 1995 the European Union (EU) laid 
down a privacy policy which also says 
that the term individual-related refers 
to those data of a person which can 
directly or indirectly be used to clearly 
identify a person (Europäisches Parla-
ment 1995). 
Gary T. Marx offers a different ap-
proach by defining certain limits of 
privacy (Marx quoted by Bohn et al. 
2003: 205-206): 
• "natural limits" refer to the physical 
limits of observability; 
• "social limits" refer to the basic 
confidence that social groups have 
in other people's attitude towards 
private data; 
• "physical or temporal limits" refer 
to the fact that different areas of life 
can exist in isolation without influ-
encing each other; 
• "situational limits" refer to the fact 
that what is said or done unthink-
ingly may be forgotten after some 
time. 
Accordingly a person's privacy is 
violated if one of these limits is 
crossed. 
The protection of the private sphere is 
valuable, because it protects the indi-
vidual's liberty and autonomy (Rössler 
2003: 18). The protection of privacy is 
therefore founded on everyone's right 
to lead a free and autonomous life. 
This statement is also reflected in the 
argumentation of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht (German Constitutional 
Court) concerning the so-called Cen-
sus Verdict. The term "informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung" (control over one's 
personal data) and its value are ex-
pressed most clearly here: 
"If somebody cannot overlook with 
sufficient certainty which information 
concerning certain areas is known to 
his social environment (…) he can be 
significantly hindered from planning 
and deciding in a self-determined way. 
(…) If somebody has to reckon with the 
registration of his participation in a 
meeting or a citizens' initiative by the 
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authorities and with the danger that 
risks for him are involved, he will 
perhaps not exercise his corresponding 
basic rights (German Constitutional 
Law, Article 8, Paragraph 9)." (Krisch 
2005: 9) 
Therefore the control over one's per-
sonal data is a basic principle of the 
free democratic constitutional state. It 
is as important for the individual's 
chances for development according to 
the German Constitution as for the free 
democratic state which is based on the 
active participation of its citizens 
(Krisch 2005: 9). 
Criteria for the protection of the private 
sphere 
From the explanations above criteria 
for the protection of informational 
privacy and the use of personal data 
can be deduced. They were summa-
rised and are internationally known as 
the "Principles of Fair Information 
Practice" (CASPIAN et al. 2003; OECD 
2003). In principle personal data shall 
only be collected in a range as limited 
as possible, only if highly necessary 
and they shall only be used for fixed 
purposes ("collection limitation and 
purpose specification"). Personal data 
shall remain concealed as far as possi-
ble and only be passed on or published 
in a limited and selective way ("ano-
nymity and pseudonymity"). It must be 
guaranteed that unauthorised persons 
do not have access to data which has 
been collected ("confidentiality"). 
Individuals have the right to know 
when and under which circumstances 
data is collected. This can be guaran-
teed by an obligation to obtain ap-
proval for example. Later on data 
subjects shall have access to their data 
as well as the possibility to correct or 
delete it and to object to its use 
("transparency and access"). This 
means that the operators of RFID 
systems must be considered reliable in 
so far as they need to show a serious 
interest in keeping the data up-to-
date, as well as complete and correct. 
They are also obliged to use only the 
amount of data agreed upon for the 
specific purpose agreed upon. There 
must be an entity to which individuals 
can complain in case of conflict ("con-
fidence and security"). 
Example: RFID at retail 
Many publications focus on the use of 
RFID at retail trade. The reason is 
perhaps that some companies plan on 
introducing RFID in the near future or 
they already test it (SOREON 2004). 
RFID in conjunction with the so-called 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) will be 
used for the globally unique identifica-
tion and tracking of items from pro-
duction to disposal (Krisch 2005: 4).11 
Apart from product-specific data, 
further information about the context 
of the product can be stored. The 
following paragraphs are to be under-
stood as a demonstration of potential 
using possibilities. 
The EPC system of tags in connection 
with so-called smart shelves, i.e. 
shelves equipped with readers, can 
record the shopping behaviour of a 
costumer without being noticed. In 
conjunction with the use of a 
personalised loyalty card, a credit card 
or surveillance cameras the data 
collected can be unmistakably be tied 
to the identity of this person. Classic 
"data mining"12 methods allow the 
construction of detailed consumer 
profiles afterwards. It may contain 
information about a customer's habits, 
his potential spending capacity and his 
social environment. This information 
can be directly used for individual 
pricing as well as advertising 
measures.13 
                                                       
11Further information:                                    
www.epcglobalinc.org (6.11.2005) 
12 "Data mining" describes the systematic 
detection and extraction of unknown 
information, mostly automatic or semi-
automatic, from a great amount of data, to 
analyse among other things a consumer's 
shopping behaviour and to develop tar-
geted marketing strategies (Wikipedia 
2005). 
13 This is demonstrated for example by a 
virtual tour through the Metro Future 
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As the tags remain functional after the 
products have been bought, they can 
be scanned by every reader which is 
equipped according to the same stan-
dards. As a result, without knowledge 
(or consent) someone can be identified 
via the products carried along. If a 
combination of data concerning place, 
time and identity of a person is auto-
matically stored in a backend data-
base, a person’s movement from 
location to location can be retraced. 
Moreover it is possible that alongside 
the global EPC network, more data-
bases are set up by the operators for 
their own individual purposes. In 
general, this means: The more readers 
are installed in public space, the more 
detailed an individual can be profiled 
and tracked. 
Potential restrictions on the private 
sphere 
The example mentioned above shows 
that the afore-mentioned criteria 
which should guarantee the protection 
of the private sphere and the "Princi-
ples of Fair Information Practice" can 
all be easily violated. 
The reason for this is mainly the 
technology's "invisibility", as the scan-
ning and storing of data can go unno-
ticed by the person concerned. The 
readers can be placed invisibly. Tags 
can be incorporated into the packaging 
material or embedded in a way that 
goes unseen to the naked eye. Data 
transmission needs neither direct 
contact nor is it restricted to intervisi-
bility, therefore it is virtually impossi-
ble for people to know when or where 
the reading process takes place and 
they are being identified.14 Additionally 
                                                                 
Store, where the use of RFID is tested in a 
pilot project. Metro Future Store Initiative: 
www.future-store.org/multimedia/virtual 
tour mpeg1.zip. (10.4.2005) 
14 In comparison, if a barcode system is in 
use the customer will always know be-
cause a contact between barcode and 
scanner is necessary to read the code. 
Besides, the barcode only contains the 
name of the product (e.g. Philadelphia 
the example of the Metro scandal at 
the beginning of 2004 shows that the 
use of RFID is not always disclosed to 
customers (FoeBuD 2004).15 Hereby 
the criteria of reliability and security 
are also violated, as individuals cannot 
have confidence in unknown data 
processors and they cannot exercise 
their right to be informed about their 
data, to correct or cancel them, if they 
do not know who they are (cf. Krisch 
2005: 15). Data processing is not 
transparent to private persons – this 
contributes to the "invisibility" of the 
technology. According to Krisch, the 
data collected can also be linked and 
retrieved without a directly known 
name. Thus the persons concerned do 
not have the opportunity to be in-
formed about the storage of their data 
and check it, because they would have 
to know the product specificcodes. Yet 
this is impossible without special 
technical equipment (cf. Krisch 2005: 
13). 
Now and again cases are uncovered 
where the security systems of RFID 
operators fail when data is transmitted 
or stored in a backend machine. These 
cases can result in data abuse (Rentrop 
2005). Yet experts believe that privacy 
is less put at risk by attacks on the 
RFID system, than by its normal opera-
tions (Oertel et al. 2004: 55). 
Existing protection measures 
The fact that RFID is being increasingly 
used on the product level may lead to 
a situation where nobody can escape 
the collection of personal data via 
RFID. In this case the simplest way to 
                                                                 
Cream Cheese), while EPC contains a 
globally unique ID (e.g. Philadelphia cream 
Cheese Nr. 9388485DCo). 
15 Metro had integrated RFID tags into 
customer loyalty cards without informing 
the customers. This practice was stopped 
after the scandal had been uncovered by 
the civil rights organisation FoeBuD und 
Katherine Albrecht from the organisation 
CASPIAN, because Metro feared that 
negative publicity would continue to harm 
its image (FoeBud 2004). 
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protect oneself by not participating 
would no longer be an option. 
So far there are no serious protection 
measures from the technical point of 
view. Although customers in the Metro 
Future Store's pilot projects are offered 
the possibility to deactivate the tags, 
they cannot check whether the tags 
have been completely deactivated or 
whether they have only been rendered 
temporarily inoperable and can be 
activated again at a later time without 
being noticed (FoeBuD 2004). A further 
protection means propagated by the 
industry is the use of "blocker tags". 
They behave like transponders and 
disrupt transmission. However, they 
cannot be looked upon as reliable as 
the closeness to the reader is mostly 
accidental. Neither the reliability, nor 
whether it functions correctly, can be 
controlled (cf. Oertel et al. 2004: 53; 
CASPIAN et al. 2003). The removal of a 
tag from a product cannot be rated as 
an acceptable solution as well as 
consumers might thus exclude them-
selves from services or even be sus-
pected of theft or forgery. Presently the 
only reliable method to prevent data 
transmission between tag and reader 
is to keep the tag wrapped in alumin-
ium foil (Langheinrich 2004: 24). But 
this is not an acceptable and long-
lasting solution by which consumers 
can be protected. Critics of the present 
situation are therefore primarily con-
cerned with the fact that producers 
and traders simply shift the responsi-
bility to customers who themselves 
have to pay attention not to suffer 
from disadvantages (Langheinrich 
2004: 29; CASPIAN et al. 2003). 
Another way to solve the problem 
could be found by the introduction of 
new laws. Although data protection 
acts on a national and European level 
exist, there are concerns that it will 
become more and more difficult to 
control and maintain them because 
data processing technologies are 
getting increasingly complex and 
miniaturised (Oertel et al. 2004: 109). 
As we have already seen, the use of 
RFID might result in conflicts with 
present data protection regulations 
(Laschet/Brisch 2005: 84). The authors 
of the study on the "Modernisierung 
des bundesdeutschen Datenschutzge-
setzes", commissioned by the German 
Ministry of the Interior, conclude that 
the data protection law is by no means 
prepared for the development of omni-
present data processing (Roßnagel et 
al. 2001). Therefore existing deficien-
cies in the laws are to be found and 
new laws must be created, which are 
especially suited to the use of RFID. 
While this has not been realised by 
many politicians (FoeBud 2005), today 
the first attempts are (being) made.16 
Comparison with other technologies 
To assess the effects of RFID on the 
informational private sphere RFID 
ought to be studied in the context of 
similar technologies. There are huge 
differences in the experts' evaluation of 
the situation. It ranges from the opin-
ion that the new systems do not really 
offer anything that has not been possi-
ble so far, to the concern that tracking 
via RFID implies a new quality of 
surveillance (Oertel et al. 2004: 55). 
There are already numerous possibili-
ties to collect data or observe private 
persons via the internet, surveillance 
cameras, the storage of telephone calls 
or the use of credit or payback cards to 
name but a few. It is already widely 
known that especially the internet can 
be used for the purpose of data-mining 
(cf. Reischl 2001). Moreover it is com-
mon practice today to sell personal 
data to third parties (Leuthardt 1996: 
146). In all these cases data can be 
collected without being noticed by the 
user and the actual purpose can rarely 
be checked. 
                                                       
16 There are examples on the EU-level (cf.  
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
2005) as well as in the Federal Republic: 
The Ministry for Consumer Protection held 
a conference on "Verbraucherpolitik in der 
digitalen Welt. Der gläserne Kunde", where 
RFID was directly dealt with (cf. FoeBud 
2005). 
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Likewise the definite aim of numerous 
projects is the tracking of individuals 
(Reischl 2001: 175). Many suppliers of 
mobile phones and radio networks 
offer the localisation of mobile phones 
and their owners as standard equip-
ment that goes with Location Based 
Services (Reischl 2001: 173). The 
Global Positioning System (GPS) which 
is used in navigation systems can 
locate objects even more exactly. 
Therefore it has to be emphasised that 
the private sphere can also be violated 
in similar ways by other technologies. 
Yet RFID is different from some of the 
other technologies because of "always 
being on", which means that there is 
no possibility to switch it off voluntar-
ily. 
3.2 The discussion about a possible 
emergence of a surveillance state 
RFID like no other technology of 
Ubiquitous Computing17 has led to 
concerns about surveillance in the 
population (Langheinrich 2004). In the 
following chapter the questions if and 
how RFID can be used for governmen-
tal surveillance and which role surveil-
lance plays in a democratic society will 
be dealt with, as well as the issues of 
how on the one hand the government, 
on the other hand the population cope 
with it and which consequences may 
result from it. 
Surveillance in western democracies 
Due to certain specific qualities RFID 
can be used to observe individuals. But 
the adoption of RFID does not neces-
sarily lead to surveillance. However, 
the informational infrastructure pro-
vided by RFID can generally create the 
                                                       
17 Ubiquitous Computing describes the 
omnipresence of digital data processing 
and can be understood as the enhance-
ment of the Internet Era. It contains the 
possibility to retrieve data anywhere at any 
time (Mattern 2001). Mark Weiser is looked 
upon as father of the Ubiquitous Comput-
ing theory. He decisively determined this 
term in his essay from 1991 (cf. Weiser 
1991). 
demand for further interpretation, and, 
consequently, for surveillance also by 
the government (Rössler 2001: 226; 
Oertel et al. 2004: 47). 
Foucault (1976) analyses Bentham's 
principle of the panoptic and transfers 
it metaphorically to the disciplinary 
techniques of modern society. Fou-
cault understands the principle of the 
panoptic as an important organisa-
tional principle of western liberal 
societies. The permanent possibility of 
surveillance hereby causes the indi-
viduals to discipline themselves almost 
without the need for any social con-
trol. Deleuze further develops Fou-
cault's idea of the disciplinary society 
in his theory on the controlling society 
(Deleuze 1993: 255). While surveillance 
techniques in Foucault's sense are 
linked with institutions, Deleuze 
emphasises the penetration of society 
with flexible and permanent control 
and surveillance techniques. He sees 
the basis for the change in the means, 
i.e. in new forms of communication 
and surveillance techniques (Deleuze 
1990: 259). From today's point of view 
RFID can be regarded as such a tech-
nique in many ways. 
Mass media often deal with surveil-
lance only in connection with totalitar-
ian regimes. This leads to the impres-
sion that surveillance necessarily leads 
to a totalitarian regime, i.e. that only 
this kind of regime would use it. But 
surveillance is not absolutely negative 
and does not only exist in totalitarian 
regimes. It may have very different 
effects in different kinds of cultural 
contexts with different value systems 
(cf. Lyon 2001: 26). For example, it can 
also serve the protection of individuals 
and groups, as well as the safeguard-
ing of liberty, equality and social 
justice. Moreover it is indispensable 
for the protection of the democratic 
constitutional laws (cf. Lyon 2001: 31). 
But the abuse of surveillance by the 
government can never be excluded. 
Abuse occurs, if the government uses 
its power inadequately and does not 
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act in the interest of the majority of the 
population, or violates civil liberties. 
This would be the case if data were 
collected and used for controlling 
purposes secretly or against a person's 
free decision (cf. Rössler 2001: 226). 
Selection processes which are based 
on the scientific interpretation of data 
and which may result in the discrimi-
nation of entire groups of the popula-
tion constitute another significant 
problem (cf. Peissl 2003: 13). Schulzki-
Haddouti (2004: 170) mentions the 
example of the discrimination against 
religious minorities, for example after 
the terrorist attack of September 11, 
2001 in the United States, which was 
caused by indistinctly defined com-
puter search. This process is also 
called social sorting (Lyon quoted in 
Mattern 2003: 25). The protection of 
the population from crime and the 
protection of privacy both require a 
careful act of balancing. Furthermore, 
to which extent the preventive collec-
tion of data is regarded legitimate, also 
depends on the subjective impression 
of a threat posed by criminal attacks 
on the one hand or a violation of 
constitutional rights by the govern-
ment on the other hand. 
In the last few decades a gradual 
reversion of attitude towards law and 
order could be noticed. The original 
presumption of innocence has 
changed more and more into a general 
presumption of guilt (Leuthardt 1996: 
110). This change of the searching 
principle can be realised when looking 
at the change of legal regulations in 
the last few years. While formerly 
unlawful behaviour had to precede the 
search, today preventive observation is 
commonly established in law (cf. 
Leuthardt 1996: 109). The most recent 
trend is the adoption of profiling 
methods. Therefore one might suppose 
that the data aggregation caused by 
RFID will also attract the government's 
attention.18 
                                                       
18 This is exemplified by the latest legal 
changes, for example the abolition of 
Citizens and surveillance 
Citizens have become used to surveil-
lance and do not reflect it very criti-
cally anymore, an attitude which might 
become dangerous. Especially the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 have raised awareness about 
issues of national security. For many 
people the individual's need for secu-
rity seems to outweigh the interest in 
the protection of privacy. Therefore 
Greiner (2005) considers the popula-
tion's need for security to be the actual 
"enemy of freedom". On the other hand 
many citizens are aware of surveillance 
but do not feel disturbed or restricted 
in their privacy (cf. Winsemann 2005). 
The wide-spread acceptance of surveil-
lance leads some authors to speak of a 
"nothing to hide mentality" (cf. Winse-
mann 2005).19 This behaviour can 
obviously be attributed to the common 
concern to arouse suspicion by refus-
ing observation measures. Jutta Lim-
bach, former president of the German 
Constitutional Court, is worried that 
people will lose the pleasure of ex-
pressing their different opinions and 
committing themselves, if the govern-
ment electronically observes its citi-
zens in all domains of life (cf. Schul-
zki-Haddouti 2004: 159). Whether the 
                                                                 
confidentiality in banking in Germany on 
April 1, 2005 (Kaiser 2005), the demand for 
a prolongation of storage time for tele-
phone data to three years by the German 
Minister of the Interior Otto Schily (cf. 
Deutschlandradio 2005), the demand for an 
extension of DNA analyses and the setting 
up of a nationwide gene database (cf. WDR 
2005), or the decision of April 12, 2005, 
which permits police and public prosecu-
tors to profile and track individuals via GPS 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2005). 
19 Winsemann mentions as examples the 
widespread use of pay-back cards in spite 
of public information campaigns, web cams 
in discotheques and pubs or a chip im-
planted into the upper arm as a method of 
payment. She comes to the conclusion that 
these measures are rather looked upon as 
"fashionable accessories" and that the 
consequences concerning data protection 
and privacy are ignored (cf. Winsemann 
2005). 
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individual citizens consider the pur-
pose of observation to be legitimate 
(positive observation) or a restriction 
on their civil rights or even a threat 
(negative observation) depends on their 
respective threat assessment. 
Historical context: Technologies and 
fears of surveillance  
The debate about RFID and surveil-
lance should be seen in historical 
context. Since the 1980s there has 
been a debate about fears of surveil-
lance in context with technological 
development (Lyon 2001: 31). 
Leuthardt examines the historic devel-
opment of surveillance methods and 
fears in correlation with electronic 
data processing strategies. He shows 
that from the first databases to the 
development of chip cards to the 
introduction of the internet the possi-
bilities of data aggregation and inter-
pretation have been continually im-
proved and therefore also have been 
accompanied by fears of surveillance 
(Leuthardt 1996). During the last 
decades slogans like "electronic pan-
optic" or the "transparent citizen" or 
the "transparent society" were coined 
which also re-appear in today's de-
bates. We already leave electronic data 
tracks permanently which can be used 
for observation and controlling pur-
poses by interested parties (cf. 
Leuthardt 1996: 129). Therefore the 
question if RFID leads to a surveillance 
state is obsolete. More important is the 
question whether RFID and its embed-
ding into a network of existing surveil-
lance technologies will cause a new 
quality of surveillance. But this ques-
tion could not be answered clearly so 
far. 
3.3 RFID and consumer goods 
Products equipped with RFID tags can, 
to a certain degree, be called "smart", 
because they offer the use of further 
functions and because there are proc-
esses which can be automated.20 
Especially in networks with other 
technologies RFID-"smart" objects can 
trigger far reaching changes in every-
day life which have been hardly issued 
in the public media so far. 
Dynamic pricing 
The existence of highly automated 
networks of RFID equipped devices 
can lead to an economy in which the 
information about the "location and 
quality of goods, the means of produc-
tion and people is available in real 
time and unprecedented accuracy" – a 
"now-economy" (Müller et al. 2003: 
172).21 This might result in an ap-
proximation to the so-called "perfect 
market" (ibid.). Besides, the pricing 
system can be controlled in a highly 
dynamic way in real time on the basis 
of analysis in supply and demand 
(Bohn et al. 2003: 212-213). In practice 
this could involve an automatic change 
of a product's price at very short inter-
vals. This kind of pricing might mean 
in turn that the predictability of prices 
becomes more difficult or even gets 
impossible for customers who might 
become confused. Moreover, the 
question arises whether this model is 
fair. Will a dynamic pricing system 
discriminate against certain groups of 
consumers, maybe because their 
working hours do not allow them to go 
shopping at a favourable time? Or is it 
more likely that the shelves will always 
be refilled according to demand with-
out the need for higher prices? Even 
                                                       
20 "Smart" has become an in-term and is 
therefore insufficient for a clear definition 
of the qualities implied (von Locquenghien 
2005: 4-10). In this paper "smart" only 
refers to the limited technical qualities and 
possibilities of RFID unless else specified.  
21 Three qualities identify a "perfect market" 
in the classic micro-economic theory: 1. 
the exchangeability of goods, 2. the com-
plete overview of all market participants 
over the latest information and procedures 
and 3. the abolition of temporal or physical 
advantages for certain competitors. With 
this explanation Bohn et al. refer to David 
Krep's "A course in microeconomic theory" 
(cf. Bohn et al. 2003: 213). 
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today dynamic pricing models are used 
in other branches. Bohn et al. mention 
for example the hotel prices at the time 
of a fair, ski passes in the high season 
or on weekends, flight prices and 
internet auctions (2003: 213). But the 
acceptance of these examples cannot 
automatically be assumed for other 
products, as these mentioned goods 
could be considered luxury goods, 
which are dispensable if necessary. 
Basic food does not allow this option, 
however. 
It has already been explained that 
prices can be established individually  
on the basis of customers’ profiles. 
Here as well the question arises as to 
how far social inequalities might be 
strengthened or more justice can be 
created. In this case the retailers’ 
attitude would be crucial. 
Silent commerce 
Objects which "purchase" certain 
things themselves because of their 
context sensitivity are called "autono-
mous purchasing objects" (Bohn et al. 
2003: 216). A frequently cited example 
is the fridge that checks its contents 
and takes care of the refill according to 
the consumption behaviour of its 
owner. The term used for this proce-
dure is "silent commerce" (ibid.). It 
shows that things happen in the back-
ground without a person directly being 
involved in the decision-making proc-
ess. While on the one hand this pas-
sive way of shopping can be very 
comfortable, it might also lead to a 
feeling of loss of control. To avoid this 
danger, the procedures should be 
made as transparent and comprehen-
sible for the user as possible. Another 
problem is the accountability issue. 
What happens if the fridge has ordered 
the wrong product? Who is responsible 
for the damage? There are fears that 
"the reasons for the damage which is 
done because components from com-
puter hardware, programmes and 
network data working in combination 
can usually not be cleared up, because 
the complexity of these systems can-
not be controlled, neither from a 
mathematical nor a legal point of view" 
(cf. Behrendt/Hilty/Erdmann 2003: 20-
21). This is a basic problem of partly 
autonomous systems. However, con-
sidering the fact that up to now there 
are hardly any autonomous purchasing 
objects in private use, I consider 
exaggerated fears of this kind of risks 
to be wrong. The factors mentioned 
can still be taken into account when 
these products are designed and there 
is a realistic chance that most of them 
can be regulated by the functioning 
market itself. 
Pay-per-use business models 
Bohn et al. consider an extension of 
the pay-per-use business model onto 
all kinds of everyday objects possible 
via objects which would be uniquely 
identifiable and equipped with the 
latest communication technology 
(2003: 217). Thus the producer of a 
sofa might automatically get a transfer 
of a few cents when it is used., i.e. 
when sensors coupled with RFID tags 
and wireless internet connection 
would report this. Bohn et al. mention 
different examples of already working 
pay-per-use business models, e.g. 
charges for telephone, electric current 
and water as well as public transport 
and television. Before every use a 
conscious decision concerning the 
financial consequences is necessary. 
While one might assume on the one 
hand that this leads to stress as these 
decisions about the use of everyday 
objects would have to be made very 
frequently, one has to keep in mind on 
the other hand that the conscious 
decision making concerning the con-
sumption of electric current or water 
has also been shifted to the back-
ground. But simultaneously this exam-
ple shows that the charges arising can 
hardly be checked afterwards. This 
could become a problem with everyday 
objects and increases the possibilities 
of abuse. Users might fall into a debt 
trap, a development which could be 
observed when mobile phones were 
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introduced on a large scale (cf. Schufa 
2004: 172). Yet there is proof that the 
increase of information and the fact 
that people got used to the terms of 
payment resulted in a decrease of 
debts (ibid.). It might be possible that 
the wide-spread use of these terms of 
payment for everyday objects would 
also lead to this effect. Besides, the 
social consequences would be inter-
esting: Will fewer guests be invited if 
each use of the sofa is charged? Will 
other seating habits be developed? Will 
this lead to a change in the cultural 
significance of property? 
Specified services 
If RFID tags are embedded into ob-
jects, it is possible to assign all the 
single parts of a machine to a pro-
ducer. It is conceivable that a function 
could be incorporated into machines 
which would prevent spare parts from 
another firm being put in. This would 
severely restrict the free choice of 
spare parts and it would imply the 
exclusion of certain services for cus-
tomers with lower incomes. This 
principle can also be transferred to 
other services like maintenance and 
repair. It is questionable, however, if 
companies would be interested in such 
a function at all, as they would risk a 
damage to their image if customers did 
not accept the principle. On the other 
hand the question would have to be 
studied whether the use of the pre-
scribed parts would even increase the 
safety of the product significantly and 
thus bring about an advantage for the 
user. 
Dynamic and personalised insurance 
models 
Insurances might also be interested in 
personalised data which reflects the 
everyday behaviour of individuals 
(Bohn et al. 2003: 218). RFID and 
sensor containing objects can be able 
to record the individual consumption 
and behavioural habits of their own-
ers, to transmit these to insurances 
that in turn could offer dynamic and 
highly personalised insurance bo-
nuses. The smart refrigerator could 
transfer information about eating 
habits, the sensor-equipped car would 
be able to transmit detailed data about 
the driving habits of its owner to the 
insurance (cf. Langheinrich 2005). 
However, the question must be raised, 
if these data produce a true picture of 
reality and if this could lead to a fairer 
billing system. In general, problems 
could arise comparable to those in the 
previous examples concerning verifi-
ability, abuse and financial calcula-
bility. Yet a positive effect based on 
individually measurable data could be 
an increased awareness for issues of 
health and risk in the population. 
Digitally upgraded everyday objects 
By means of RFID every object can be 
assigned specific information. This 
information can be retrieved automati-
cally via the internet and transmitted 
by different media. So far mainly 
producers and operators can make use 
of data storage on the object, but in 
the future consumers might also reap 
the benefits. These could be operating 
instructions for electronic devices, 
recipes for cooking, information about 
the ingredients of food, instructions 
for care and maintenance, guarantee 
information, advertisements, bonus 
features or personal comments which 
can be scanned by privately owned 
readers. Presumably the additional 
digital features will increasingly influ-
ence the assessment of products' 
qualities. 
"What is displayed in every single case, 
may depend on the context, i.e. on the 
question whether the consumer is a 
long-time customer and has paid a lot 
for the product, whether he is over 18, 
which language he speaks, or his 
present whereabouts – maybe even on 
the question whether he belongs to the 
right party." (Mattern 2003: 9) 
Mattern's statement shows that the 
information can be offered in a very 
flexible and personalised way, but at 
the same time he refers to the risks 
involved. He also raises the question of 
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who determines the contents of the 
object's statement, and who guaran-
tees their objectivity and accuracy 
(Mattern 2003: 11). An objection would 
be that the contents of every mass 
media, e.g. television or internet, can 
be ideologically prejudiced just as well 
and in a certain respect are always 
shaped by subjective interests. Like-
wise the accuracy of information can 
rarely be completely guaranteed and 
proved. In this sense RFID containing 
objects are simply a new medium 
which will be affected by an already 
existing problem. Besides, this issue of 
acceptance of digitally upgraded 
objects will also depend on the influ-
ence a customer can exercise on the 
display of the data. An advertising film 
constantly showing on a display of the 
refrigerator would most likely be 
disapproved of, yet occasional re-
quested information on a certain 
product might be welcomed. 
3.4 RFID's influence on health and 
environment 
Consequences for health and environ-
ment must also be considered a factor 
influencing everyday life. Little re-
search has yet been done in this field. 
Generally speaking, 
"the influence on environmental as-
pects like disposal, consumption of 
resources and energy by a large scale 
implementation of ubiquitous comput-
ing technologies […] is hardly predict-
able, especially because a change of 
lifestyles, more dynamic economic 
circles and new consumer habits as a 
consequence of the new technology will 
react upon these parameters" (Bohn et 
al. 2003: 231). 
With good reason this statement can 
be transferred to RFID, as it is looked 
upon as one of the key technologies of 
ubiquitous computing. 
Electromagnetic radiation 
RFID being a radio technology is 
connected with electromagnetic radia-
tion when operated. Health risks 
caused by radiation have been re-
searched and debated in public so far 
only with reference to mobile phones 
and their effects. RFID's radiation 
effects on health have not been clari-
fied as yet and long term effects in 
particular have not yet been re-
searched (cf. Hilty et al. 2003: 240). 
Furthermore it is well-known that the 
distance between the source of radia-
tion and the body has a strong influ-
ence on the intensity of the exposition. 
Future applications like the integration 
of RFID tags into clothes or their 
implantation into the human body may 
therefore raise the level of exposition 
to radiation. Advocates of RFID object 
that the radiation of RFID is lower than 
that of mobile phones and that it is not 
always active but only "on call", and 
therefore not or significantly less 
dangerous (cf. Cisco 2004). However, 
in workplaces where RFID systems are 
constantly in use, the radiation might 
have a much more negative effect than 
expected. This demonstrates the 
"urgent need for research" 
(Behrendt/Hilty/Erdmann 2003: 18). 
Implantation of transponders 
Medically, the implantation of RFID 
tags into a human body is already 
feasible, but it is not widespread yet. 
There are no accurate research results 
concerning harmful effects of RFID 
tags implanted into the body. First 
concepts for medical applications of 
RFID are now being developed, for 
example the implantation of a sensor 
and transponder to permanently 
measure and monitor the intraocular 
pressure of patients with glaucoma 
permanently (cf. IMS 2005). For 
chronically ill people, the monitoring 
of different physiologic parameters 
could mean a higher degree of safety 
and a better quality of life. Moreover, 
an implanted RFID chip could incorpo-
rate personal medical information, 
which might be life-saving especially in 
cases of emergency. However, there is 
a critical objection that the implanted 
medical information could create a 
problem concerning data protection 
laws. For chronically ill people the 
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advantages might outweigh the disad-
vantages, for many others, however, 
the dangers would be considerably 
higher than the advantages. Further-
more it has to be dealt with the issue 
that the implantation of RFID tags 
might lead to negative psychological 
consequences.22 What does a person 
feel about an implanted and simulta-
neously linked tag which sends data 
from inside the body: would it be 
perceived as a prosthesis, as a foreign 
body, as an unwanted intruder or 
traitor? Or even as a fashionable 
accessory as can be seen in the case of 
the Baja Beach Club? The question if 
RFID tags are implanted voluntarily, is  
definitely one of the most crucial 
issues for their acceptance. 
Health management 
A tag on food and medicine containing 
detailed information on the product 
may help to promote applications 
which compare the ingredients auto-
matically with individual incompatibili-
ties and give warning signals in case of 
danger. Besides, a check could be kept 
on the correct taking of medicine. The 
first prototypes of smart medical 
cupboards reminding users of taking 
their medicine or informing them 
about medicine that expired have 
already been developed (cf. IMS 2003). 
Yet it has to be criticised that the 
devices for dispensing them are diffi-
cult to operate for the intended target 
group, i.e. mainly senior citizens. The 
interface would have to be improved 
and become better suited to the target 
groups. 
The genuineness of medicines 
The pharmaceutical industry in the 
United States plans to integrate RFID 
tags into the packaging of medicine in 
order to document their genuineness 
and location because many products 
are forged (cf. Computerwoche 2004). 
                                                       
22 Paul Virilio (1999) extensively considers 
the relationship between technology and 
the body, yet without giving attention to a 
special technology (also see Misoch 2005). 
This could mean a higher security 
standard for patients as fakes can be 
distinguished from originals, if pa-
tients get the possibility to scan the 
tags. But the question remains if the 
problem of fakes will not simply be 
transferred. If criminals for example 
used empty original packaging and 
filled it with forged products then the 
possibility to distinguish this medicia-
tion from originals would be consid-
erably lower. The problem could only 
be solved by killing the tags after the 
consumption of the medicine. But this 
is technically not yet possible and it 
would probably not be easily imple-
mented. 
Stress 
RFID has the potential to reduce stress 
in everyday life. Automated admission 
control might shorten waiting queues 
for example. If people were reminded 
of their everyday tasks they might 
carry them out more reliably. But, 
depending on the use of the technol-
ogy, this might also lead to negative 
stimulus satiation (cf. Hilty et al. 2003: 
245). It has to be emphasised that even 
the uncertainty of potential risks might 
result in a physical health risk. The 
feeling of being threatened can for 
example lead to insomnia, and corre-
spondingly involve health problems 
(ibid.: 238). This feeling may be caused 
by fears of radiation, surveillance or of 
losing control likewise. 
Electronic waste 
During my research I did not find any 
plans for the disposal of RFID 
electronics. Today RFID applications 
are mainly confined to closed systems. 
"Disposable labels" in the form of 
smart labels on products at retail for 
example are not widely in use. 
"If smart labels were affixed to all 
supermarket products in the future, 
then billions of these chips would get 
into the household waste. Although a 
single chip weighs far less than a gram 
the total sum of all these chips would 
add up to several thousands of tons of 
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electronic waste." (Bohn et al. 2003: 
231) 
Separate disposal could become a 
problem because tags can be inte-
grated into packaging materials. On 
the other hand, RFID offers the possi-
bility to optimise recycling processes 
because waste materials could be 
identified and separated more effi-
ciently with the help of the data stored 
(ibid.). This might simplify waste 
disposal for the individual as machines 
could do the separating automatically. 
But up to today this concept cannot be 
technically realised yet. 
Monitoring of the environment 
In the future tiny sensors and RFID 
equipped devices might be able to 
monitor and document environmental 
phenomena in a so far unprecedented 
way. These data collections could lead 
to a potentially new understanding of 
certain processes in nature which in 
turn could enable scientists to find out 
about environmental disasters at an 
earlier date. Accordingly early warning 
systems could be used in a more 
targeted way. In the same way infor-
mation about the populations of 
threatened species might be collected 
which could lead to new scientific 
findings. But apart from the tagging of 
animals there can hardly be found any 
applications in this sector until now 
(Oertel et al. 2004: 95). 
3.5 The relationship to RFID contain-
ing objects 
If embedded RFID tags can make 
everyday objects smart, then this can 
influence the perception of these 
objects as well as the individual's 
relationship to them. Psychologists 
and sociologists have only just gained 
interest in RFID. For a more detailed 
analysis the existing and future pilot 
projects would have to be studied 
extensively. The following chapter 
deals with the factors that might 
influence the relationship between 
man and RFID containing objects. 
 
Recognition of RFID containing objects 
It is important to know whether the 
individual can realise at all that an 
object has been changed i.e. that it 
represents more than its physical 
appearance and its conventionally 
known functions. Only then the differ-
ence in the relationship to an RFID 
containing object can be examined. 
The following factors are decisive: 
• The visibility of the technology: 
many tags which are in use today 
are so small that they can hardly be 
noticed, and are placed invisibly or 
integrated into packaging material. 
The same can be said for readers, 
as well. 
• The visibility of the reaction to the 
reading process: even if the tech-
nology itself is not visible, the reac-
tion to the reading process can be 
noticed, for example when a ski 
pass automatically releases the 
turnstile. 
• Knowledge about the use of the 
technology: this can be achieved by 
information about the use of smart 
labels on a shelf in the supermar-
ket, on the packaging of products 
or by public notice, for example. 
It can be assumed that those different 
ways of recognition will influence the 
individual realisation of the object and 
the emotional relationship to it. Yet if 
the object does not seem changed at 
all, RFID will probably neither directly 
influence the way the object is per-
ceived nor the relationship between 
man and smart objects. It would also 
be necessary to study delayed or 
indirect effects which are not in first 
place linked with the visibility of the 
change. 
Benefits of the application 
Furthermore it is important to know 
whether the new quality is seen posi-
tively or negatively. Hereby a few 
elements might be of importance:  
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Personal advantage:23 If the additional 
quality or function is seen as an 
advantage, it can be assumed that the 
object will be looked upon in a more 
positive and confident way than one 
without this technical upgrading. The 
degree of the positive realisation 
would grow accordingly if the function 
was used frequently and the positive 
result confirmed. It is different with 
applications which are complicated or 
do not function in the expected way 
and therefore lead to frustrations. The 
user might become mistrustful and 
finally see the object in a negative light 
(cf. Norman 1988: 11). 
Advantage for others: Not every appli-
cation implies a direct advantage for 
the user of the object. If a customer 
profile is created for marketing pur-
poses the subjective advantage can 
only be perceived indirectly, if at all, or 
might even be seen solely on the 
operator's side. If users don’t accept 
this kind of external benefit, they 
might feel to be at the mercy of the 
object or even feel threatened by it. 
Impression of autonomy and aliveness 
For different reasons electronically 
upgraded everyday objects are attrib-
uted the ability to act autonomously or 
being alive. On the one hand the way 
of communication about smart objects 
influences the perception of their 
qualities. In related literature human 
qualities are often used to describe so-
called smart objects. This kind of 
rhetorical description produces the 
picture of a strongly emotional and 
socially aware autonomous acting 
object, which in reality simply executes 
certain pre-programmed functions 
without any reflection (Reeves/Nass 
1996: 4). 
Apart from the descriptive attribution 
of human qualities, observable fea-
tures also contribute to the perception 
                                                       
23 Here I transfer Donald A. Norman's 
(1988) results from his psychopathologic 
study of everyday things to RFID contain-
ing everyday objects. 
and evaluation of smart objects (Ram-
mert/Schulz-Schaeffer 2002: 29). The 
impression of autonomy furthermore 
depends on the degree of context 
sensitivity and the actual autonomy of 
decision making behaviours, as has 
been briefly shown by the examples 
above. If the technological process is 
unknown, a person easily gets the 
impression that the object itself is 
"speaking" or "acting" and therefore 
appears to be "intelligent", because of 
the reaction caused by the object 
directly being attributed to the object 
itself.24 In this context Adamowsky 
speaks of a re-emerging so-called 
"magic effect" (2003: 4), which is even 
emphasised by the "invisibility" and 
complexity of technologies such as 
RFID. Turkle (2004) also deals with the 
effects of "affective computing". Espe-
cially children tend to react emotion-
ally to "intelligent" toys and clearly 
attribute to them a certain kind of 
"aliveness". More and more this effect 
can also be observed with grown-ups. 
However, the problem of grown-ups 
ascribing "aliveness" to "intelligent" 
artefacts is by no means new: it has 
already been noticed and analysed by 
Weizenbaum in the 1970s (cf. Weizen-
baum 1977). From today's perspective 
the topic becomes even more relevant 
than ever before because of the devel-
opment of new advanced technologies 
and their integration into highly com-
plex systems. 
The physical as well as the communi-
cation design can therefore be consid-
ered as one of the most influential 
factors for the relationship between 
man and RFID containing objects. 
When looking at today’s applications, 
it becomes clear that the design op-
tions for RFID containing smart ob-
jects and their communication inter-
faces are still wide open.  
                                                       
24 For a detailed analysis of technical 
artefacts and their perception as acting 
objects, I would like to refer to the paper of 
Werner Rammert and Ingo Schulz-
Schaeffer (2002) who extensively deal with 
relevant concepts.  
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A smart card implying the function of a 
key is most likely regarded as a new 
physical form of a key or a type of 
switch. The card would be looked 
upon as an instrument, which would 
not result in a closer emotional rela-
tionship (cf. Krämer 1998: 83-84). 
If the object’s physical or communica-
tion design gives the impression of 
being alive however, it would most 
likely lead to a greater emotional 
reaction of the user. 
Therefore RFID containing objects 
should first be separated into different 
categories before being analysed. As a 
result it has to be taken into account, 
that the relationship between man and 
RFID containing smart objects can 
probably neither be treated like the 
man-machine-relationship nor like the 
man-robot or the man-computer-
relationship. In these cases the func-
tion and the significance of newly 
introduced objects had been altogether 
new. Thus they could be perceived as a 
unity, and new ways of man-machine 
interaction could be acquired step-by-
step. Comparatively, RFID applications 
are expected to lead to unfamiliar 
situations because of the fact that 
everyday objects with already well-
known qualities will additionally gain 
one or more so far unknown qualities. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The consideration of potential future 
applications and their possible effects 
shows, that RFID has the power to 
bring about considerable changes. 
Apart from some chances, serious risks 
are to be expected. Today the extent of 
the changes can not yet be assessed as 
the future development of RFID tech-
nology and applications is still widely 
open.25 It is exactly this openness as 
                                                       
25 In the TA-Swiss paper on the precaution-
ary principle in the information society 
from the year 2003, this open potential for 
development is called "Januskopf chances" 
as the situation offers chances as well as 
risks (cf. Hilty et al. 2003: 265). 
well as the awareness of potential 
risks which offer the chance to the 
people to deeply influence future 
developments and to actively take part 
in this process. A generalisation of 
concerns about RFID should be 
avoided, however, because of the 
diversity of existing technical systems 
and different applications in connec-
tion with their intentions. All members 
of society likewise have to take on the 
responsibility regarding the further 
development of RFID. 
Developers: They can dictate, facilitate 
or exclude certain ways in which a 
technology can be used by creating the 
technical and organisational frame-
work. "What is technically prevented, 
does not have to be outlawed." 
(Roßnagel/Lütge 2005) as soft- and 
hardware regulate the rules in cyber-
space in a similar way as laws do in 
the real world (Lessig 1999: 6). 
Operators:26 Their attitude decisively 
determines the way RFID systems are 
deployed and how they treat those 
people who are affected by the appli-
cations. Operators should be greatly 
interested in maintaining the trust of 
customers and staff (cf. Capgemini 
2005: 16). Therefore they should keep 
their specific application of RFID as 
transparent as possible and allow 
affected people to make a conscious 
decision about their participation as 
well as the option to permanently 
deactivate their tags. Operators should 
equally pass on some of the benefits 
resulting from the application of the 
RFID system (ibid.). 
The government: It is the government's 
task to mediate between the different 
interest groups in society and to inter-
vene if necessary. This includes the 
revision of existing laws in order to 
guarantee their applicability in the 
context of new technologies as well as 
                                                       
26 The term shall include everybody who 
operates an RFID system and/or uses the 
data collections produced hereby for data 
mining purposes. 
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the establishment of new laws. Hereby 
the government should apply the 
methods of technology and risk as-
sessment and include experts in their 
discussions. At the moment the im-
pression that German data protection 
officials are not taken seriously is 
alarming.27 Furthermore, globalisation 
processes lead to a legislation, which 
is tremendously under pressure due to 
international requirements or other 
internationally powerful states. Even 
though national governments often-
times have an area of discretion con-
cerning international laws, they rarely 
make use of it, but follow the general 
trend, without investing much time in 
a critical reflexion.28 The close tie 
between politics and industries also 
state a severe influence on political 
decision making. Last but not least the 
responsibility of states also implies the 
protection of the individual's rights. A 
fact which nowadays sometimes seems 
to be eclipsed. 
Citizens: They also bear part of the 
responsibility by their attitude towards 
new technological developments and 
applications, a fact which is often 
underrated. At present the population 
does not seem to be well informed 
about RFID. This might be due to a bad 
information policy on the part of the 
operators, but also due to a lack of 
                                                       
27 For example the data protection official 
of the Federal Republic, Peter Schaar, had 
criticised the Federal Government in his 
progress report published in April 2005. 
The Minister for the Interior, Otto Schily, 
countered that Schaar "had gone beyond 
his competence, and that it was not his 
task to assess technical questions and 
comment on political decisions" (DPA 
2005).  
28 A good example is the quick implementa-
tion of biometric data in passports for 
example. (cf. DPA 2005; Die Welt 2004). 
Biometric data is stored on RFID tags 
integrated into the cover of the passport. 
The functionality of RFID tags as well as 
their potential health risks have not been 
assessed yet especially in long term use. 
Additionally they have been implemented 
regardless of emerging concerns about 
privacy issues. 
interest on the part of the population. 
This attitude is alarming, because a 
passive behaviour neglects the chances 
of shaping the path of new technolo-
gies. However, this can lead to the 
dreaded imbalance in the considera-
tion of different social interests. Civil 
rights activists, for instance, have 
already proved that and how the 
population can actively exercise its 
influence through various actions.29 
"While the analysis of a technology only 
answers the question of what the future 
can bring, the question of what the 
future may bring must be answered by 
a societal process." (Mattern 2003: 29). 
Although controversies about risks and 
conflicts are often perceived as distur-
bances for society, economy and 
democracy, they should rather be seen 
as a learning process, as a productive 
element and a basis of democracy (cf. 
Petermann 2001: 7). Therefore the 
present discussion about the spreading 
of RFID should be regarded as an 
important occasion to re-negotiate the 
different interests occurring within a 
society and to discuss the fear of an 
omnipresent surveillance by the gov-
ernment. Basis for this process should 
be a balance of considering personal 
advantages as well as potential social 
costs. The democratic system is not a 
rigid structure; on the contrary it 
requires negotiation and must be 
understood as a never-ending perma-
nent re-shaping process (cf. Marchart 
2002: 296-297). Panic related to RFID 
technology, like some authors try to 
spread, is not justified at this time. 
However, they make an important 
contribution by bringing the topic to 
public attention and by taking part in 
the public debate. 
The most important issues at stake 
should be to objectify the discussion, 
to inform and involve the public, to 
abolish existing myths about the 
technical potential of RFID, to intensify 
                                                       
29 E.g. CASPIAN (www.spychips.com) or 
FoeBud e.V (www.foebud.org/rfid). 
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the interdisciplinary debate about 
potential effects of the technology as 
well as to commonly work on a stable 
societal solution. 
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